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Nitya Verma 
DATA-DRIVEN ACCOUNTABILITY: EXAMINING AND REORIENTING THE 
MYTHOLOGIES OF DATA 
In this work, I examine and design sociotechnical interventions for addressing 
limitations around data-driven accountability, particularly focusing on politically 
contentious and systemic social issues (i.e., police accountability). While organizations 
across sectors of society are scrambling to adopt data-driven technologies and practices, 
there are epistemological and ethical concerns around how data use influences decision-
making and actionability. My work explores how stakeholders adopt and handle the 
challenges around being data-driven, advocating for ways HCI can mitigate such 
challenges. 
In this dissertation, I highlight three case studies that focus on data-driven, 
human-services organizations, which work with at-risk and marginalized populations. 
First, I examine the tools and practices of nonprofit workers and how they experience the 
mythologies associated with data use in their work. Second, I investigate how police 
officers are adopting data-driven technologies and practices, which highlights the 
challenges police contend with in addressing social criticisms around police 
accountability and marginalization. Finally, I conducted a case study with multiple 
stakeholders around police accountability to understand how systemic biases and 
politically charged spaces perceive and utilize data, as well as to develop the design space 
around how alternative futures of being data-driven could support more robust and 
inclusive accountability. I examine how participants situate the concepts of power, bias, 
and truth in the data-driven practices and technologies used by and around the police. 
viii 
With this empirical work, I present insights that inform the HCI community at the 
intersection of data design, practice, and policies in addressing systemic social issues.  
Lynn Dombrowski, Ph.D., Chair 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) focuses on the intersection of humans and 
technology, with increasing attention being paid to how technology impacts larger, 
societal issues (e.g., social justice, health and wellness, criminal justice, etc.) [Baumer & 
Silberman, 2011]. Similarly, critics of big data have indicated that data-driven 
technologies in particular (i.e., business intelligence tools, predictive tools, AI decision-
making support tools, etc.) stand to exacerbate existing biases, which is 
disproportionately consequential for at-risk and marginalized populations around social 
issues of poverty, criminal justice, mental health, etc. [boyd & Crawford, 2013; Eubanks, 
2018]. However, because quantitative data enables organizations to rationalize efforts and 
legitimize decision-making [Morgan, 1997], public and private sector organizations1 have 
been scrambling to adopt data-driven practices and technologies [Williams, 2015; 
Delgado & Stefancic, 2015]. For human-services agencies, particularly like the police, 
who are under intense criticisms, being data-driven can provide ways to better serve at-
risk people and increase accountability. In the context of this research, I define 
accountability as a condition of being responsible and answerable to the public for what 
and how workers perform on an agency and individual level, including how they do and 
do not equitably work towards their organizational mission, with respect to the law 
[Walker, 2001].  
Subsequently, as data-driven practices becomes more prevalent and promises 
improved accountability, researchers voice concerns about the data use limitations as it 
stands to change how we define, create, and engage with knowledge, particularly in 
                                                 
1 Global revenue from BI and analytics tools was projected to reach $16.9 billion in 2016, a 5.2% annual 
increase [25].   
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human-services contexts, where people’s unpredictable nature is inherent [boyd & 
Crawford, 2012; Marshall et. al., 2016; Verma & Voida, 2016]. Researchers, for 
example, argue that the shift towards quantitative data changes assumptions about the 
meaning of knowledge and about how people “should” engage with information [boyd & 
Crawford, 2012]. They contend that there is an increasingly pervasive “mythology” of 
big data:  
…the widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of 
intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously 
impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy. [boyd & 
Crawford, 2012] 
This mythology must become more transparent in research about data-driven 
technology since these systems are the most prominent user-facing manifestation of ‘big 
data’ and its related computational turn in thinking within organizations. Understanding 
these mythologies and how they manifest on-the-ground for stakeholders is necessary in 
order to mitigate the negative impacts of being data-driven, especially in politically 
contentious spaces (i.e., crime, poverty, mental health, etc.). My dissertation addresses 
the gap in the literature of studying the human experience and impact of technologies that 
manifest the computational turn. In doing so, I contribute at the intersection of design, 
practice, and policies for being data driven [Jackson et. al. 2014]. Through this research, I 
have identified the mythologies of being data-driven and how data use can constrain the 
space for action within an organization; the limitations around how data politics inhibit 
trust from stakeholders; and lastly, how stakeholders experience data use as an extension 
of police’s power in the quest for accountability. Subsequently, this dissertation 
contributes design guidelines and implications for designers, practitioners, and policy-
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makers to help mitigate the limitations and biases associated with data-driven 
technologies and practices. 
More specifically, I use data-driven human-services organizations as a case site 
for investigating the limitations and challenges around data use. I use two cases of 
human-services organizations—nonprofit and police—to understand how the participants 
experienced being data-driven as organizational values [Verma & Voida, 2016], as well 
as the challenges and limitations they faced in adopting data-driven technologies and 
practices [Verma & Dombrowski, 2018]. Particularly, most of this dissertation 
investigates the problem and design space around police’s data use. Data-driven policing 
promises to improve police accountability through eliminating “undesirable biases,” 
introducing “more fairness into the police decision-making process,” and improving 
internal and external accountability practices [Davis, et. al., 2016; Joh, 2014].  
However, while data-driven policing can improve accountability in some ways, there are 
limitations in how such data practices create the conditions for and ensure accountability 
to the public, including how data can be used to shape and legitimize agendas, frame 
narratives, and perpetuate existing biases and inequalities [Verma & Dombrowski, 2018]. 
These design challenges, identified in my research, are even more important to 
address when considering the impact data use has for at-risk people and marginalized 
communities around historically and politically contentious social issues of crime, drug 
abuse, mental illness, and poverty. As evident from previous research, technology and 
data are not neutral nor free from values, interests, and biases. No data is truly “raw”; the 
identification and decisions of what data is to be measured and how data is categorized 
are political acts, motivated implicitly or explicitly by different values [Crawford, 2013; 
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Ribes & Jackson, 2013]. Values and biases are embodied through the design of the 
systems and practices as data is produced and used by police [LeDantec et. al., 2009; 
Voida et. al., 2014; Friedman et. al., 2006; Swenson, 2014]. 
While politics and systemic inequalities are responsible for creating social issues, 
such as police accountability, I contend that technology use can and must play an 
important role in dismantling existing biases and inequalities instead of exacerbating and 
perpetuating them. With this research, I advocate ways for the biases and agendas 
embedded in technology to be evaluated and mitigated as data-driven technology and 
practices become more prevalent in our society. In order to address these limitations, this 
dissertation aims to reorient the mythologies around data use (e.g., objectivity, 
transparency, and trust) into pragmatic design guidelines for the HCI community to 
consider. For example, while using data in an objective and neutral manner is 
implausible, there are sociotechnical interventions that can strengthen the objectivity in 
data representations, by being inclusive of key perspectives around data use. I discuss 
design implications for how the concept of ‘strong objectivity’ can be incorporated into 
data-driven technologies and practices [Harding, 1995] to help mitigate the power 
disparities that emerge with a single group of people shaping data (and subsequently, 
spaces for action). I contribute guidelines for achieving strong objectivity at the 
intersection of data design, practice and policies. Similarly, I also present design 
implications for what it means for HCI to discuss politically contentious social issues that 
revolve around systemic power disparities, especially since being data-driven is adopted 
with the goal of improving trust. In such cases, I argue that using data for police 
accountability with an attitude of mistrust is more conducive because there are historical 
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and systemic reasons for the absence of trust between police and POC communities. 
Mistrust is an appropriate value in certain contexts [Carey, 2017], and I argue an 
important one for addressing and mitigating the existing biases in police accountability 
narratives. With mistrust as a value in design, I advocate that data representations can 
more satisfactorily address the social scrutiny police face, for instance. Subsequently and 
finally, I argue that while data can be used to hold organizations and individuals 
accountable, there are design opportunities to hold data use accountable as well. For that 
end, I present design guidelines for information transparency, which here refers to 
disclosing constraints and criterion around data production and usage. Information 
transparency is an important key in creating more robust and inclusive accountability 
between organizations and their stakeholders.  
Ultimately, my dissertation addresses the following research questions around the 
limitations of data-driven technologies and practices in human-services contexts: 
1. How do the mythologies of data use manifest as organizational values for 
stakeholders? How does data stand to rationalize and legitimize spaces for action 
for these stakeholders? 
2. What are the challenges stakeholders experience in using data-driven technologies 
for shaping accountability? 
3. What are key value tensions for accountability between groups of people with 
large power disparities (i.e., police and marginalized communities)? 
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1.1 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This research draws from literature in five areas of related work including 
information management in human-services organizations (nonprofit & police), data-
driven policing, data politics, community informatics, and accountability in government 
and HCI. 
Chapter 3: Methods 
In this three phase research, I conducted case studies mainly using qualitative 
methods to better understand data-driven technologies and practices, related 
sociotechnical challenges, and possible design interventions for human-services. This 
dissertation is a product of these research activities. By utilizing these qualitative 
methods, I am able to identify the practical and on-the-ground limitations and challenges 
data use and how data-driven rhetoric is intertwined with larger principles of truth, 
accountability, and power. 
Chapter 4: Mythologies of Data-Driven Technologies and Practices 
In this chapter, I present results from my first case study of the use of data-driven 
systems in a nonprofit, human services organization. I characterize four mythologies of 
data-driven systems that participants experience as shared organizational values and are 
core to their trajectory towards a “culture of data”: data-driven, predictive and proactive, 
shared accountability, and inquisitive. For each mythology, I also discuss the ways in 
which being actionable is impeded by a disconnect between the aggregate views of data 
that allows them to identify areas of focus for decision making and the desired “drill 
down” views of data that would allow them to understand how to act in a data-driven 
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context. These findings contribute initial empirical evidence for the impact of data-driven 
technology’s epistemological biases on organizations and suggest implications for the 
design of technologies to better support data-driven decision making by legitimizing non-
traditional forms of data. 
Chapter 5: Challenges and Limitations in Data-Driven Policing 
In this chapter, I present results from my second qualitative field study about the 
adoption of data-driven policing strategies in a Midwestern police department in the 
United States. Proponents of data-driven policing strategies claim that it makes policing 
organizations more effective, efficient, and accountable and has the potential to address 
some policing social criticisms (e.g. racial bias, lack of accountability and training). What 
remains less understood are the challenges when adopting data-driven policing as a 
response to these criticisms. Here, I identify three key challenges police face with data-
driven adoption efforts: data-driven frictions, precarious and inactionable insights, and 
police metis concerns. I demonstrate the issues that data-driven initiatives create for 
policing and the open questions police agents face. These findings contribute an 
empirical account of how policing agents attend to the strengths and limits of big data’s 
knowledge claims, as well as help me develop the problem space for how biases manifest 
in data-driven policing, as well as how data-driven policing can hinder accountability. 
Chapter 6: Re-Orienting Data-Driven Mythologies 
In this chapter, I present results from the final qualitative field study with various 
stakeholders around police accountability, including police officers, anti-police activists, 
and various community members. While data-driven policing is meant to improve police 
accountability and their relationships with the communities, my results demonstrate that 
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stakeholders’ concerns around data use for police accountability revolve around how data 
stands to be an extension of police’s power. These key issues emerge around who has the 
power to create and legitimize data as knowledge, who gets to utilize that data to receive 
and allocate resources and services, and finally, how police’s data use stands to 
exacerbate the policing and surveillance of marginalized communities. These empirical 
findings contribute to how the limitations around data bias stand to impede accountability 
efforts, as well as the design space for mitigating those limitations. 
Chapter 7: Design Implications 
In this section, I pull together the empirical work to demonstrate the design space 
around data-driven technology and practices. Ultimately, this research contributes to the 
calls for the HCI community to consider design implications around the limitations of 
data use and what it means for the human-beings being served by such organizations. 
Here, I contend that biases and agendas embedded in technology need to be evaluated 
and mitigated as data-driven technology and practices become more prevalent in our 
society.  In order to address these limitations, I aim to reorient the mythologies around 
data use (objectivity, transparency, and trust) into pragmatic design guidelines for the 
HCI community to mitigate the inherent biases in data use. To mitigate the mythology of 
objectivity, I use the concept of strong objectivity to demonstrate how designers and 
practitioners could mitigate the power disparities in whose voices are represented in the 
design, practice, and policies around data. To address the issue of data framing narratives, 
I advocate for designing with principles of information transparency. Finally, I argue that 
to improve data’s credibility further, particularly in contentious and power disparate 
contexts, mistrust is a more appropriate value to adopt to guide data practices. Ultimately, 
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when bias can be understood as situated in a larger system, rather than an individual 
shortcoming, we as a society can become better equipped to mitigate the disparities that 
emerge through bias. This dissertation aims to provide sociotechnical interventions for 
the HCI community at the intersection of data design, practices, and policies. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Through these three case studies, I use human-services organizations’ adoption of 
data-driven technologies to examine the limitations of data use for accountability and 
mitigating power disparities. This chapter concludes with broader implications around the 
sociotechnical interventions for being data-driven in more robust ways, as well as future 
directions for research. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
This research draws from the following areas of related work: information 
management in human-services organizations (nonprofit & police); more specifically, 
data-driven policing; data politics; accountability in government and HCI. These 
literature sections will help situate the following research questions around the limitations 
of data-driven technologies and practices in human-services contexts: 
1. How do the mythologies of data use manifest as organizational values for 
stakeholders? How does data stand to rationalize and legitimize spaces for action 
for these stakeholders? 
2. What are the challenges stakeholders experience in using data-driven technologies 
for shaping accountability? 
3. What are key value tensions for accountability between groups of people with 
large power disparities (i.e., police and marginalized communities)? 
2.1 Information Management in Human-Services 
This dissertation explores data use in human-services through two kinds of case 
sites: nonprofit and police organizations. While the missions and the influence of these 
organizations varied, both organizations work with at-risk people, with similar 
sociotechnical constraints (i.e., funding, man-power, IT infrastructure, etc.). In this 
section, I first briefly outline literature on data and information management in the 
nonprofit sector, then discuss the background and role of technology in police. 
Nonprofit Sector 
The nonprofit sector serves many critical functions and offers services that are 
underprovided by the government and the for-profit sector [Mair et. al., 2015; Salamon & 
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Sokolowski, 2004; Burkholder, 1992; Miller et. al., 2007; Reeves & Burt, 2006]. 
Nonprofit organizations are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their performance 
and impact to funding agencies (e.g. [Yin, 1994]). So while data collection is a 
substantial part of the work that most nonprofits do, there is increasing evidence of the 
costs: “Nonprofits are often collecting heaps of dubious data, at great cost to themselves 
and ultimately to the people they serve” [Snibbe, 2006]. Research about performance and 
accountability in nonprofit organizations suggests that as data collection becomes the 
focus, data-collection tools can diminish the quality of service to clients leading to less 
effective performance [Benjamin & Campbell, 2014; Kong, 2008; Benjamin, 2008]. 
Kong also notes that it is not helpful to apply management strategies that work in the for-
profit organization to organizations in the nonprofit sector because those strategies 
typically fail to address the social dimension of mission-driven organizations [Kong, 
2008].  
More generally, nonprofits often operate under significant constraints in technical 
resources and expertise that can make collecting, managing, and using data a challenging 
endeavor [Voida et. al., 2012; Herman, 1994]. 
Police 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss policing history in 
depth, here, I focus on the evolving policing philosophies related to law enforcement’s 
purpose in the US. Further, I situate how both changing technological landscape and 
policing philosophies impact technology choices and outcomes in this section. 
Manning describes the role police in America as a bureaucratic organization that enforces 
political order through force [Manning, 2005]. However, police’s legitimacy is not 
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infallible, their practices have been subject to criticisms and called to change. Since the 
1960s, citizens have made calls to reform police efforts based on the traditional policing 
model [Archbold, 2012; Sparrow, 1988]. Traditional policing refers to “responding to 
calls for service and managing crimes in a reactive manner.” The traditional policing 
model values quantitative factors like arrest numbers and police officer response time, 
but not necessarily issues related to a community’s quality of life [Archbold, 2012]. 
Many of these call for reform want police efforts to focus on a community policing 
approach, which is distinguished by collaborations between police and community; 
management, personnel, and information technology support; and lastly, a problem-
solving orientation to develop and evaluate police strategies to reduce crime instead of 
solely enforcing the law [Archbold, 2012; Cops, 2011]. According to the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, about 70% of police departments in 2013 included at least one 
community policing component  in their mission, an increase from 53% in 2007 [Reaves, 
2013]. Community policing refers to the “systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques between the police and the community. These strategies proactively 
address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, 
social disorder, and fear of crime.” These calls for reform coincide with a diminishing 
perception of police legitimacy and police-community relationships in the US [Kochel, 
2011; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006].  
While researchers suggest that information technology (IT) adoption offers 
benefits like better administrative support, improved productivity and increased 
efficiency, scholars have raised questions about how police work computerization 
impacts community outcomes [Nunn, 2001; Chan, 2001; Lewis & Lewis, 2011]. These 
13 
concerns focus on detrimental changes to policing outcomes and efforts associated with 
computerization. The first major concern is that IT adoption by itself does not increase 
productivity for police unless it is paired with strategic management practices situated in 
addressing community-specific problems (i.e., evidence-driven, decision-making tools) 
[Garicano & Heaton, 2010]. Secondly, while technology is meant to save time, it appears 
that in efforts to be more efficient, data work responsibilities shift to undertrained 
officers. For example, while laptops in patrol cars have provided on-the-ground, timely 
access to information2, the responsibility for data collection has shifted from over-the-
phone transcribers to the on-the-ground officers, which raises concerns about data 
accuracy and quality and the lack of technical training [Northrop, et. al., 1995]. More 
generally, law enforcement, like other public services, operates under substantial 
technical, expertise, and budgetary constraints [Nunn, 2001]. This research contributes to 
this space an understanding of how police stakeholders are thinking through and dealing 
with the social criticisms from the public, while focusing on how data and technology 
influence their internal and external accountability practices. 
2.2 Data-Driven Policing 
To fully understand how this research looks at police specifically as a case site for 
being data-driven, in this section, I present literature on the emergence of data-driven 
policing and its advantages and challenges. Data-driven policing refers to police decision 
making processes guided by evidence-based strategies to understand crime problems and 
allocate limited resources with the goals of greater effectiveness and efficiency in order 
to reduce criminal and social harm [Hardy, 2010]. While definitions vary, researchers 
                                                 
2According to a 2015 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 9 in 10 police officers in the US are 
provided with in-field computerized access to police records [6]. 
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indicate how data-driven approaches relate to and embedded in community-oriented 
policing [Peak & Barthe, 2009]. Here, I use ‘data-driven policing’ to refer to the 
multifaceted, sociotechnical practices situated within the tool ecology and organizational 
practices for data-driven decision making. 
Data-driven policing is characterized by having the following components: data 
collection, analysis, local partnerships with community stakeholders, strategic operations, 
information sharing, monitoring, evaluating and adjusting operations, and measuring 
outcomes [Hardy, 2010]. Due to the prevalence of open forms of relevant data (e.g., open 
governmental data; social media), data collection and analysis is not constrained to only 
the data collected by police, but police also frequently reuse other public data (i.e. census, 
fire department, medical services). Big data in policing refers to the amalgamation of data 
sources including camera feeds, license plate readers, alert-based systems, police reports, 
public services data, crime tips, and social media. Researchers characterize big data’s role 
in policing to be predictive (applying a computational model to historical data to 
determine criminal activity’s future likelihood), repurpose already available data, and 
engage in mass surveillance [Joh, 2014]. While police agencies have conducted crime 
analysis on their own historical data to track trends, data-driven policing is distinguished 
by the characteristics related to big data (i.e., large volumes, variety of data at much more 
real-time velocities). Data-driven policing is also, in part, the police’s response to social 
criticisms of police practices in attempts to be more proactive and accountable [Manning, 
2001]. However, researchers have called for more research on how big data can support 
police accountability [Brayne, 2017]. I build on this work to demonstrate the challenges 
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in using data-driven strategies to address criticism through designing from police and 
community perspectives.  
Law enforcement research identifies many benefits of data-driven policing 
including optimizing police resources, eliminating human biases, encouraging 
accountability within the police agencies and to the community, problem-solving, 
improving community support and engagement, and reducing crime [Kochel, 2011; 
Dabney, 2010; Brayne, 2017; Weisburd, 2003]. Researchers argue that by implementing 
data-driven policing, technology eliminates “undesirable biases” to “introduce more 
fairness into the police decision-making process” as a means to address recent social 
criticisms against police [Joh, 2014]. While organizational changes like committed 
management, defined objectives, and data expertise can help organizations work towards 
these benefits, researchers have called for further research to understand how data-driven 
policing strategies impact police practices, stakeholder relationships, and outcomes [Joh, 
2014; Braga & Weisburd, 2015].  
Researchers in sociology and public policy have also identified several technical 
and social challenges in the adoption and use of data-driven practices in policing. There 
are substantial IT infrastructure challenges that exacerbate IT management issues such as 
inaccurate data entry, lack of data quality, legacy systems, and siloed databases [Nunn, 
2001]. Social issues around police big data use point out how data frequently perpetuates 
and confirms police biases since data is not objective in nature [Joh, 2014; Brayne, 2017]. 
For example, big data can reproduce inequalities by exacerbating surveillance for 
individuals already under suspicion. Similarly, researchers warn against relying on data 
alone to make decisions rather than supplementing independent police assessment. For 
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example, researchers fear that data could prime officers to look for crime in certain 
communities, instead of neutrally assessing the risks [Brayne, 2017]. Big data in policing 
also magnifies concerns about the fourth amendment—the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches—as it enables “perpetual indiscriminate data collection of entire 
populations” [Joh, 2014]. Similarly, data-driven policing critics raise concerns about the 
lack of understanding regarding long-term impacts of data-driven strategies, using data to 
justify over-policing disadvantaged communities, and community relationships with the 
police [Kochel, 2011; Gangadharan, 2012]. While new strategies create positive media 
attention, researchers raise concerns about the effectiveness of using big data products 
and practices from the for-profit industry in mission-driven organizations like policing 
[Sklansky, 2011; Kochel, 2011]. As mission-driven organizations, police agencies are 
often characterized by issues of hierarchical, rigid command structure of police 
organizations, lack of data dissemination through the ranks, and lack of accountability on 
how data collection feeds into their strategies and goals, which all adds to the data-related 
challenges police agencies face. Other challenges include police officers’ resistance to 
change, preference for traditional policing, and difficulty implementing new programs 
[Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Sadd & Grinc, 1994] 
Researchers recommend both technical and social efforts to alleviate these 
challenges for police in adopting data-driven policing. These recommendations include 
improving the IT infrastructures, aligning work practices with data-driven objectives, and 
providing committed management and expertise [Joh, 2014; Dabney, 2010; Manning, 
2008]. This research contributes to this work by empirically identifying the social and 
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technological challenges that hinder police accountability, as well as how stakeholders 
envision the design space around data-driven practices and tools. 
2.3 Data Politics 
Here, I review literature on how data politics manifests in public-services 
organizations as big data marks a computational turn in thinking within organizations. 
Data politics here refers to the inherent subjective and biased nature of data based on 
decisions around what is measured, who has the power to decide, and how the data is 
produced. Multiple researchers have raised concerns around the potential misuse of data 
in regards to how the politics of data manifest in organizations, such as: decontextualized 
nature of data, embedded epistemological biases, inaccurate or incomplete data framing 
narratives and space for action, and digital divides [boyd & Crawford, 2012; Berry, 2011; 
Crawford, 2013; Swenson, 2014]. This research investigates the problem space for 
mitigating these inherent biases and limitations of data use. 
boyd and Crawford argue that ‘big data’ is an interplay of three elements: (1) 
technology that gathers, links, and analyses large data sets; (2) analysis for economic, 
social, technical and legal patterns; and (3) mythology that data can offer a higher form of 
intelligence and knowledge [boyd & Crawford, 2012]. Similarly, Morgan’s seminal 
scholarship on the metaphors through which we understand organizations highlights 
quantitative data as one of the mythologies shaping organizational life, lending decision 
making a semblance of rationality [Morgan, 1997]. Although definitions of big data vary, 
researchers increasingly acknowledge that big data is less about the size of the data and 
more about gleaning knowledge from of the data [Burkholder, 1992; Ribes & Jackson, 
2013]. Big data represents a social and cultural shift in how we create and use 
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knowledge: “Big Data reframes key questions about the constitution of knowledge, the 
processes of research, how we should engage with information, and the nature and 
categorization of reality” [boyd & Crawford, 2012]. Because big data is a sociotechnical 
phenomenon, it entails all the biases that come from “human design” [Crawford, 2013].  
There is, however, a dearth of empirical evidence of the nature of these biases and how 
they play out in practice.  
While data can be misused due to its decontextualized nature, research also raises 
questions about the role of qualitative knowledge in decision making in data-driven 
organizations [Verma & Voida, 2016; Marshall et. al., 2016; Bopp et. al., 2017]. This 
concern is especially relevant for professions that require higher levels of metis, which 
refers to practical knowledge, gut instinct, and experience [Scott, 1988]. Metis is 
“knowing how and when to apply the rules of thumb in concrete situations” and is often 
grasped through experience instead of explicitly taught. As big data favors quantitative 
data, it is important to understand how this epistemological bias impacts organizations 
and their stakeholders [Verma & Voida, 2016; Marshall et. al., 2016].  
Data is embedded with biases and values throughout data collection, cleaning, 
analysis, and presentation processes [Pine & Mazmanian, 2015; Verma & Voida, 2016]. 
While academics widely acknowledge data’s politicized nature, data-driven practices and 
technologies are marketed as enablers of objectivity, accuracy, and truth in order to 
provide accountability and legitimacy to decisions [Pine & Mazmanian, 2015; Suchman, 
1993; Winner, 1999]. Values are also enacted in practice, through the use of the 
technology [LeDantec et al., 2009; Voida et. al., 2014]. And researchers have advocated 
for understanding values tensions in contexts where the same values may be shared by 
19 
both technology design and end users but where the logics behind how those values are 
enacted are different [Voida et. al., 2014].  Subsequently, researchers call for empirical 
research on the nature of how these biases and data politics play out in implementation, 
especially how data can be used to frame narratives and shape the space for action 
[Crawford, 2013; boyd & Crawford, 2012; Verma & Voida, 2016].  
Research about public services using data to support decision-making have also 
characterized issues of data perpetuating discriminatory actions such as algorithm-based 
technology recommending longer jail sentences for black offenders [Lum, 2017; 
Eckhouse, 2017]. Researchers have also warned about how marginalized communities 
can be at higher risks for harm and loss of opportunities through data inclusion by public 
services [Gangadharan, 2012]. Similar studies have found that data collection in public 
services is often marred with inaccurate accounts that fail to capture work flows and that 
logics behind organizational accountability can impact organizational effectiveness 
negatively [Pine & Mazmanian, 2014; Pine & Mazmanian, 2015]. 
Organizationally, big data brings issues of digital divides in organizations 
between those who have data access, skills, and literacy [Swenson, 2014; Ferguson et. al., 
2014]. Researchers raise concerns about the biases of big data leading to new digital 
divides between data haves and have-nots and between individuals and organizations that 
do and do not have computational literacies [boyd & Crawford, 2012; Kitchin, 2014]. 
Manovich suggests that in this era of big data, there are three types of people: those who 
create data (both consciously and by leaving digital footprints), those who have the 
means to collect it, and those who have expertise to analyze it [Manovich, 2011].   
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This dissertation builds on this body of work to provide empirical accounts of 
how data politics impact police actions and accountability as well as investigate design 
directions for mitigating these inherent biases and limitations of data use. 
2.4 Community Informatics 
This research has indicated that simply adopting data-driven tools and practices 
does not inherently support accountability from stakeholder perspectives and it is 
important to explore how involving external and internal stakeholders in shaping data-
driven policies and practices can address accountability concerns. In the follow section, I 
articulate key lessons learned from prior literature regarding the strengths and challenges 
when including such individuals into governmental policy and decision-making 
processes. First, I will discuss the strengths and limits of community lead governance as 
described in public policy literature. Second, I will look at how HCI, predominantly 
through community informatics, digital civics, and participatory design has informed 
design by collaborating with stakeholders.  
Community engagement in governance provides formalized ways for citizens to 
participate in decision making around policies that impact them [Carol, 2007; Schuler, 
1996], which is key for marginalized communities to have input in their local governance 
[Taylor, 2007]. Community participation in policy making allows access to a usually 
untapped expert source of knowledge from local citizens to stimulate collective action 
[McCabe et al., 2006; Ryan et al., 2006]. As community participation becomes a public 
policy agenda focus, several key elements have been noted for successful collaborations 
between the public and local government institutions, including a source of authority to 
legitimize public-government issues and practices, follow up evaluations, formal 
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procedures and relationships to mediate community engagement, and demonstrations of 
practical engagement [Cavaye, 2004]. Success indicators for community initiatives 
include devolving decision-making powers, strategic reorganization, defining core values 
and commitments, ownership of initiatives, and establishing communication and rapport 
[Taylor, 2007; McCabe et al, 2006; Goodwin, 2005]. Barriers to successful collaborations 
include weak communication and feedback procedures, lack of transparent knowledge, 
lack of capacity and awareness within communities, resistance, under resourced 
initiatives, short-term planning, and rigid bureaucratic decision process [McCabe et al, 
2006; Goodwin, 2005]. Subsequently, public policy research warns against the pitfalls of 
these barriers to the continuation of community initiatives. Often when community 
participation encounters obstacles, the initiatives for community engagement are 
theorized as failures. Eversole calls for ways to rethink community participation in 
governance beyond a single process but as “the juxtaposition of different ways of 
governing,” viewing community engagement through different lenses of varied 
capacities, skills, and roles in policy-making. This kind of renewed perspective on 
community engagement can create new possibilities for collaboration between 
government and communities, while recognizing the value and pragmatics of community 
contributions in theory and practice. Based on this public policy literature on community 
engagement, I transition to focus on how HCI has incorporated community participation 
in design.  
Within the context of HCI, community informatics research points out the role of 
technology in supporting and creating opportunities for engaging in democratic processes 
[Muller & Kuhn, 1993; Carroll and Rosson, 2007]. Carroll and Rosson articulate the 
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interplay of participatory design and community informatics with two propositions about 
why participatory design practices matter for community-impacted innovation [Carroll 
and Rosson, 2007]. The first is a moral one, where the people most impacted by a design 
should have a substantial say in how the system is designed, developed, and used. The 
second is a pragmatic proposition, where the people who will adopt and use the design 
should contribute their perspectives and preferences in order to improve the chances of a 
successful design outcome. Historically, participatory design stems from the demand for 
increased voice in decision-making processes with higher engagement from groups of 
members to represent shared interests and values [Simonsen & Robertson, 2012]. The 
underpinning goal is to provide users with better tools to support collective goals [Muller 
et. al., 1997]. Subsequently, researchers provide a framework of themes to outline high-
level requirements for sustainable community informatics initiatives. The themes include 
identifying IT needs, organizing for IT change, learning new IT skills, and lastly, creating 
and sustaining intrinsic motivation for community participation. These requirements exist 
in tension with the general lack of resources (time, funding, skills, people) and the 
importance of direct participation in community initiatives. Researchers advocate to work 
with these barriers in order to not derail the projects. 
HCI researchers have studied technology use in interactions between community 
members and governmental agencies [Erete, 2013; Lewis & Lewis, 2012; Erete et. al., 
2014; Voida et. al., 2014]. Within in the context of community policing, we understand 
how online technology helps citizens unite and coordinate actions as well as regulate 
online and offline social norms [Lewis & Lewis, 2012]. In their study of a crime web 
forum, the researchers specifically call for technology fostering a space for collaboration 
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beyond providing information. Erete speaks to the importance of including the 
marginalized communities that are disproportionately impacted by crime in policy-
making around those issues [Erete, 2013; Erete et. al., 2017]. Her design 
recommendations advocate for elements of accountability, visibility, and participation to 
support community engagement. For instance, using online technology not associated 
with the police gave community members a space to discuss issues and solutions outside 
of the physical space to better organize as well as trace back action items. Technology 
that is not linked to the governmental agencies but fosters conversations around them 
helps alleviate the distrust community members feel. Erete points to the need of 
diversifying the avenues for participation due to personal, social, and financial barriers 
(i.e.¸ second job, childcare, lack of transportation) and calls for more research on the role 
of technology in building trust and transparency between policing and marginalized 
communities [Erete, 2013]. 
Transparency about data production and how data becomes actionable is needed 
in order to establish accountability practices. Thus, transparency becomes a “pro-ethical 
condition” and not necessarily an ethical principle since it enables or impairs other ethical 
principles [Turilli & Floridi, 2009]. This work extends community informatics research 
by looking at where technology can supplement police-community relationships and 
community participation. Similarly, researchers have listed essential factors that support 
participation: access to relevant information, opportunity to take independent positions on 
issues, inclusion in the decision-making process, appropriate methods of participation, 
and flexible organizational and technological processes [Clement, 1993].  
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2.5 Accountability in Governance 
Issues of power have remained central to government and politics, as philosophers 
throughout the ages have pondered and investigated the challenges of having too much or 
too little power [Madison, 1961]. How to keep it under control? How to prevent abuse of 
power? How to create checks and balances? Accountability is a manifestation of the 
continued concern about governmental powers and the need for oversight and 
surveillance into governmental actions [Schedler, 1999; Mulgan, 2000]. Political 
accountability is often defined and conceptualized through answerability—“the 
obligation of public officials to inform about their activities and to justify them”—and 
enforcement—“the capacity to impose negative sanctions on [those] who violate certain 
rules of conduct” [Schedler, 1999; Hales, 2008]. Subsequently, accountability is essential 
to democratic governments. As governmental organizations yield power over citizens, 
accountability mechanisms provide ways for citizens to assess, scrutinize and question 
the government’s actions [Peters, 2007]. On an underlying level, these accountability 
mechanisms are assumed to support (a) identifying poor performance in order to (b) 
mobilize the public and ultimately, (c) create change in policies and practices [Peters, 
2007]. In this section, I focus on understanding interpretations of accountability in 
governance and the limitations and challenges around these interpretations. Then, I 
specifically look at recent accountability efforts in the policing context in the US. 
Following that, I present HCI literature related to accountability in design theory and 
design practice and how this work fits in to calls for future work.  
Since accountability’s interpretations vary in governance, the way the term is used 
can have various implications for practices [Thomas, 2004].  Here, I outline three 
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predominant and overlapping interpretations. The first interpretation of accountability 
focuses on transparency [Kaufman, 2005]. In order to support accountability, 
governmental actions must be transparent for “independent and external” reviews [Peters, 
2007]. This includes answerability to specific concerns raised by stakeholders and 
general disclosure of unsolicited information about organization’s behaviors and motives 
to stakeholders. While calls for transparency by activists and citizen groups have 
remained popular, research on accountability notes that there are gaps in how 
transparency supports accountability [Hales, 2008]. For instance, Hales notes “bad 
publicity” is not sufficient for government agents to change behavior, especially when 
“information users have no formal control over disclosers, and indeed may be 
significantly less powerful” [2008]. Unless accountability mechanisms include ways for 
stakeholders to “punish improper behavior,” transparency mechanisms cannot 
sufficiently shed “light into the black box of politics” [Schedler, 1999]. For example, in 
February 2018, a local newspaper reported that MMPD failed to follow policy and review 
multiple police shootings over two years3. This raised concerns from the community 
about the futility of transparency if no one outside the organization has any power to 
create change. This research aims to understand how police and marginalized 
communities can mitigate the effects of these power disparities in making transparency 
based accountability more substantial. 
The second interpretation of accountability relates to governmental responsibility, 
where government agents act accordingly and responsibly to the established law and 
ethics [Bovens, 1999]. In this case, accountability has more implications for an 
                                                 
3 https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2018/02/04/impd-violated-policy-failed-review-19-police-
shootings/1082235001/ 
26 
organizations’ and workers’ internal values and understanding of the law [Peters, 2007; 
Mulgan, 2000]. Researcher do distinguish between internal accountability within 
organizations (workers to management and superiors) and internalized accountability of 
individual workers (how and to whom they envision being accountable to i.e., the public 
or governmental superiors). Previous scholars have raised questions about internal 
accountability in public services in terms of how non-expert supervisory members can 
hold expert professional to account [Day and Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 2000]. Similarly, 
research has also demonstrated that workers embrace internalized accountability with 
reluctance. One of the reasons the respondents reported was that they believed workers 
should be accountable to someone, but were not sure to whom exactly [Day and Klein, 
1987]. Researchers raises questions and doubts about what kinds of accountability 
practices governmental agencies engage in and which groups of people are these efforts 
geared towards [Mulgan, 2000]. My research indicated similar tensions and 
disagreements amongst police officers about what kinds of accountability and to whom 
are appropriate as they navigate being data-driven.  
Lastly, defining accountability can also refer to responsiveness of the 
governmental agents to the demands of their “political masters, clients, or the public at 
large” [Peters, 2007; Romzek & Dubnick, 1994]. Accountability here refers to the top-
down, mission-driven nature of governmental agencies with civil servants being able to 
take directions from above, to attempt to serve the public [Mulgan, 2000]. Because 
accountability is about providing ways for different stakeholders to have voice in 
decision-making and policies, agents’ ability and inclination to respond to demands from 
politicians and the wider public is key [Mulgan, 2000]. However, Mulgan points out that 
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while responsiveness can be a dimension of holding agencies accountable, being more 
responsive does not equate to increased accountability. For instance, as some public 
services have adopted a more “client” or “customer” geared management approach to 
improving efficiency, organizations have become more responsive, or “customer 
friendly” but not necessarily more accountable.  
Ultimately, while these three interpretations are not mutually exclusive, how 
organizations articulate accountability impacts how practices and mechanisms are 
adopted and shaped. This research specifically utilizes the first and second interpretation 
as lenses into understanding how community and police stakeholders, respectively, 
envision the role of data and technology in accountability. The first interpretation related 
to transparency and control to change practices is helpful in understanding community 
perspectives around police accountability. On the other hand, the interpretation related to 
responsibility is suitable in exploring how police envision accountability. It is not 
sufficient for police to provide more transparency through data if there are no 
mechanisms that allow communities to create change to practices and policies. Likewise, 
police’s data creation and use can continue to perpetuate narratives about crime and 
communities, which, besides being detrimental to marginalized communities, does not 
adequately address the calls for legitimizing the experiences of marginalized 
communities (e.g., Black Lives Matter). This research aims to address these broader 
questions regarding accountability: how do we produce possibility of accountability when 
dealing with highly unequal social stakeholders in terms of power (police vs. 
marginalized communities)? How do we create spaces (socially and technologically) 
where accounts that are not formally included in police actions can be legitimized?  
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Next, I outline certain community and police-driven efforts around accountability in the 
US.  
What about Police Accountability in the US? 
Police accountability here is defined as a condition of being responsible and 
answerable to the public for what and how police perform on an agency and individual 
level, including how they do and do not equitably manage crime and disorder with 
respect to the law [Walker, 2001]. As the sociotechnical landscape shifts through the use 
and availability of social media and camera phones supplementing the rise of the Black 
Lives Matter movement, police organizations in the US are under intense scrutiny 
[Williams, 2015; Delgado & Stefancic, 2015]. This scrutiny is in part enabled by data, as 
critics of police use data to demonstrate the problems in policing [Lum, 2017; Eckhouse, 
2017]. For example, Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG), a nonprofit 
organization, “applies rigorous science to the analysis of human rights violations” in the 
policing context4. HRDAG’s US policing project assesses and improves upon police 
violence data accuracy. Their work is, in part, a response to the lack of systematic 
collection and aggregation of data about police violence in the country, which hinders 
police accountability [Lum, 2017; Eckhouse, 2017]. Similarly, activists have created 
projects like Mapping Police Violence, which is a web-based platform that demonstrates 
police violence through visualizations. Because the government does not have an 
aggregated data set about police killings, activists created a crowdsourced and 
comprehensive database about police killings, “searching social media, obituaries, 
criminal records databases, police reports and other sources”5. These kinds of projects 
                                                 
4 https://hrdag.org/policing/ 
5 https://mappingpoliceviolence.org 
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enable activists and marginalized communities to utilize technology and data science in 
order to create mechanisms and alternative spaces for holding police accountable.  
On the governmental side, as a response to these criticisms, the US government 
has advocated for using data-driven strategies. For instance, Obama administration 
launched the Police Data Initiative (PDI) and Data-Driven Justice Initiative (DDJ) in 
2015 and 2016, respectively, to use data to “increase transparency, build community 
trust, and strengthen accountability” [Davis et al., 2016]. As of late-2016, over 120 
jurisdictions across the country, including my case site, had committed to both PDI and 
DDJ. The adoption rate of these initiatives reaches about 30% of the American 
population. However, the fate of these initiatives’ development, implementation, and 
evaluation remains unclear under the current government administration. 
Accountability in HCI  
Accountability in Design Theory 
Accountability as a concept and issue is pertinent to design. While traditionally in 
software production, accountability has focused on models of quality assurance, which is 
about measuring and evaluating the production processes and end products [Button and 
Sharrock 1998, Paulk et al 1993; Eriksen, 2002]. However, as Eriksen points out, 
accountability issues pertain very closely to social and organizational issues, and she calls 
for individuals and organizations to re-address accountability issues, keeping the 
“growing diversity and pervasiveness of technology” in mind: 
Considering the various ways in which accountability is referred to in the 
design community, and how different interpretations of the concept shade 
into and partially rely on each other, there seemed reason to pose them, at 
least as a starting point: Of what exactly is accountability an attribute or a 
feature? Is it always, inherently, ‘good’? Who defines it? For whom? 
Under what conditions? [Eriksen, 2002] 
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As she juxtaposes accountability literature in HCI and CSCW with each other, she 
calls for designers to question accountability and for whom. Through the review, she 
emphasizes the importance of developing features to make processes and practices 
“visible and accountable.” Eriksen then introduces a “rough” tool referred to ‘figure of 
thought’ [Eriksen, 1998]. This mapping tool can be used to discuss complex concepts and 
relationships and map out work practices, interactions, formal and informal 
communications. Using a figure of thought with participants could help explore the 
intricacies of systems, as well as help with issues of “multi-perspectivity- the opening up 
for multiple voices in design” [Eriksen, 2002]. This research in ways responds to 
Eriksen’s calls for asking questions around accountability in terms of power and 
underlying goals in the policing context. 
Similarly, Dombrowski’s work around social issues and design strategies 
highlights six goals of social justice: transformation, recognition, reciprocity, enablement, 
distribution, and accountability [Dombrowski et al., 2016]. The design strategy of 
accountability here refers to the ability to hold “responsible those who foster or unduly 
benefit from the oppression of others and identifying and assigning appropriate sanctions, 
penalties, or even punishments.” The researchers also acknowledge the conundrum of 
accountability: if accountability is a mechanism against the misuses of power, how can 
anyone truly hold the powerful accountable without having substantial social standing 
and power themselves? What does this mean for marginalized communities, where 
justice has been violated through systemic means? While there are no easy solutions to 
these larger questions, the authors outline “necessary commitments” for social justice 
oriented design practices, which include a commitment to conflict, reflectivity, and 
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personal ethics and politics. These commitments aim to foster political responsibility 
within designers as social justice issues continue to emerge through our technology 
production and use. Finally, the authors also advocate for building cause-based alliances 
to cultivate political capital and action for holding individuals and/or organizations 
accountable.  
Ultimately, the underlying basis for a lot of HCI and design research remains 
Suchman’s seminal work, Located Accountabilities in Technology Production [2000]. 
Suchman advocates for ‘located accountability’ or recognizing the limited and partial 
nature of our “vision” as designers in order to take personal responsibility for technology 
production. This work counters the objectivist stance where it is not possible to locate 
responsibility for how technology is created by pointing out that designers must reflect on 
and be aware of their own position in the larger network of social relations. 
Accountability for whom as a question is then about embodying personal accountability 
in design practices.  
As HCI researchers advocate for awareness and ethics around our role as 
researchers and designers, this research aims to contribute to understanding ways to 
cultivate accountability in and through the design process. This work feeds into design 
implications for designers and technologists to support ethical use of data-driven 
technologies and practices.  
Accountability in Data Practice  
As big data becomes more prevalent in society, it raises questions about the role 
of data in supporting transparency and accountability. In this section, I cover previous 
work on how decisions around data collection and use support accountability and for 
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whom. Depending on the kinds of data collected, practices around data as well as 
available infrastructure and expertise, data can legitimize and rationalize certain 
organizational and individual actions. Referring back to the political nature of data, it is 
important to emphasize that data by itself or more data does not necessarily increase 
accountability [Verma & Dombrowski, 2018]. Researchers continue to indicate the need 
to understand how data supports accountability in different contexts, as well as explore 
alternative spaces and ways of using data to hold organizations accountable. 
For example, Pine and Liboiron conducted a case study highlighting the politics 
embedded into measurements, techniques and interfaces [Pine & Liboiron, 2015]. They 
point out that while interfaces usually present data in ways that are devoid of any 
subjective “human element,” politicized human-computer interactions begin before the 
data is entered into a system. They demonstrate the concept of politics and data through a 
case study measuring maternal morbidity. While maternal morbidity rates in America are 
severely high, they found that obtaining precise maternal death data was quite difficult 
due to how the cause of death is recorded; where pregnancy is the cause of death, the 
recorded data is often mischaracterized (i.e., cardiac arrest). The measured categories do 
not support identifying a specific problem for a high-risk population. The authors directly 
relate the way this data is (or rather, is not) measured to larger political issues of 
women’s care not being taken seriously enough by healthcare professionals and policy-
makers. Their multiple examples indicate how data-driven efforts towards accountability 
do not inherently stand to improve social injustices. Rather, it matters what is measured, 
how it is measured, and ultimately, for whom.  
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Another example pertaining to research around data for accountability is Irani and 
Silberman’s work around the ethics of crowd work, specifically looking at Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers [2016]. In this design project, they deal with issues of worker 
invisibility and unfair compensation for crowd workers by designing an alternate system 
named Turkopticon. This system offered a space for workers to review and share their 
experiences with the employers, since Mechanical Turk only provides ways for 
employers to review crowd workers. By building a data collection and aggregation 
system to make crowd workers’ experiences visible, the researchers introduced an 
accountability mechanism as well as a decision support tool for marginalized workers.  
HCI research around accountability and data practices demonstrates the gaps in 
limitations of data use and how data often becomes a tool to shape spaces for action, as 
well as noting the importance of evaluating data-driven practices and tools. With this 
study, I contribute a deeper understanding of the impact of being data-driven on police 
accountability through police and community perspectives.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
In this three phase research, I conducted case studies mainly using qualitative 
methods to better understand data-driven technologies and practices, related 
sociotechnical challenges, and possible design interventions for human-services.  
In the first phase, I conducted an exploratory study of non-profit use of data 
through semi-structured interviews. This work enabled me to understand the nature of 
stakeholders’ work, the data practices and tools they utilize, and how data use relates to 
the mission of the organization. I interviewed participants across the organizational 
hierarchy to explore the challenges they face while making decisions with data and how 
this type of decision-making stands to impact the clients they serve. This set of empirical 
work provides me with a better understanding and orientation of what technology and 
data use entails at a nonprofit, in terms of organizational constrains. This phase of 
research informed the deeper dive into how data use impacts human-services 
organizations and their stakeholders. 
Next, during the second phase of this research, I built off this knowledge to 
understand another human-services context: law enforcement. While the nonprofit 
sector’s use of data shed lights on how data-driven decision-making can be 
problematized, I wanted this research to be applicable to broader contexts. Law 
enforcement being a charged context is riddled with criticisms around excessive force, 
racial profiling, and unjust discretionary practices. Researchers and activists, alike, have 
called for more stringent investigations of how technology and data stand to shape police 
work and in what ways. Initially, the goal of this research was to study a Fusion Center (a 
Federal intelligence agency) and their data use, however, case site access was declined 
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for privacy and security reasons. This led me to investigate further around how data use is 
handled in more local, law enforcement settings. In this study, I snowball sampled my 
participants, which included patrol officers, lieutenants, detectives, etc. from Midwestern 
Metropolitan Police Department. On top of the interviews, I also conducted participant 
observations in several types of police and community meetings and events. While my 
case site access was still limited in terms of what information was shared with me and 
which technologies I was allowed to know about and witness, these qualitative methods 
helped me to build a solid understanding and sensitivity to the challenges that the police 
face in their daily work, especially considering the intense scrutiny they operate under. 
These challenges when coupled with data use demonstrated how limited data use can be 
when dealing with human beings on-the-ground and the sociotechnical opportunities to 
improve police accountability and relationships with the police.  
The final phase of this research continued the investigation of how data does and 
does not support police accountability from various stakeholders’ perspectives. Because 
police accountability is a social, contentious topic with viewpoints across the spectrum, it 
became important to understand how concerns around policing and data use manifest 
across different communities, which are involved with and impacted by police actions. 
The interviews in this study focused on understanding how different stakeholders 
conceptualize “accountability” and how they see data and technology playing a role in 
this context. The interview sessions also included a brief design activity to help us 
explore the alternatives to current data use in ways that could possibly help mitigate the 
relationship issues between police and communities.  
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This dissertation is a product of these research activities. By utilizing these 
qualitative methods, I am able to identify the practical and on-the-ground limitations and 
challenges data use and how data-driven rhetoric is intertwined with larger principles of 
truth, accountability, and power. In the final chapters, I illustrate how these research 
insights can inform designer and practitioner work. In what follows, I elaborate on each 
research phase. 
3.1 Phase 1: Mythologies of Being Data-Driven and Actionable 
I conducted a case study of the use of business intelligence in one human services 
organization. Case studies are a powerful method for deriving in-depth insights in an 
organizational context [Kitchin, 2014]. Existing case studies of BI in the private sector 
have focused on characterizing challenges of and success factors for BI adoption 
[Haskins & Baron, 2011; Gartner, 2016]. Here, my focus is on the mythologies of BI use 
and the ways in which the design of BI systems supports or thwarts these mythologies. 
Participants and Data Collection 
I conducted semi-structured interviews (76 minutes on average) with 17 
individuals (5 female) who have end-user licenses to use Domo and sometimes other BI 
tools for their work at Helping Hand, a large, local affiliate of a national nonprofit 
organization that assists low–income populations. 13 participants held positions in mid- 
and upper- level management across several departments of Helping Hand; 4 participants 
worked in the IT and BI departments and were responsible for the backend data 
warehousing and the front end data analytics. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with each participant using a protocol 
focused on the following areas of inquiry:  
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• The nature of the participants’ work, their roles in the organization, and how the 
participants understood their work to fit into the mission of the organization;  
• The different data sources they use in their work; how they collect, extract, 
analyze and explore that data; and the ways they make decisions with or without 
that data;  
• The ways that the data they use relates to the mission of the organization—
whether it supports or complicates the mission; and  
• Their experiences of the constraints and benefits of business intelligence.  
• The interviews were transcribed on a rolling basis to facilitate ongoing analysis.  
I analyzed data iteratively and inductively using grounded theory [Strauss & 
Corbin, 1997]. The initial open coding foregrounded what a culture of data meant to our 
participants, resulting in thirty-three values-related coding categories. Through affinity 
diagramming and axial coding, I identified four core values: data-driven, predictive and 
proactive, shared accountability, and inquisitiveness. I returned to the data related to 
these core values, conducting another round of coding focused specifically on 
understanding the role of technology as it supports or thwarts these values, noting that 
these values also aligned with the mythologies ascribed to big data and BI tools. Through 
this analysis, I identified a series of disconnects between aggregate and drill down views 
of data that fundamentally shape and are shaped by understandings of what data is 
“actionable.” 
3.2 Phase 2: Challenges in Data-Driven Policing for Social Criticisms 
I conducted a field study of the Midwest Metropolitan Police Department 
(MMPD) studying their efforts to be data-driven. Field studies have been proclaimed as 
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substantially important in studying the police field because they allow for closer 
consideration of how citizen interactions in policing evolve [Yin 2017; Manning, 2005]. 
Here, I focus on law enforcement challenges in conducting data-driven policing.  
Before I proceed, it is important to note the challenges in accessing participants 
and spaces around the context of law enforcement. Initially, I requested organizational 
permission to research with the local Fusion Center, which is meant to connect local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies through shared intelligence. The 
administration denied my access request. Then, I decided to pursue access with a local 
law enforcement agency, MMPD, but did not hear back from the administration about 
their decision. During this time, I also attended numerous police-community meetings in 
order to speak to police officers directly. In those interactions, police officers I spoke 
with were reluctant to sit down for an interview. They mostly advised me to reach out the 
police station. At that point around nine months had passed without getting any kind of 
access to police or the police organization. Then, a personal acquaintance offered to 
connect me with a community relations police officer they knew. After about two 
months, the community relations police officer responded back and agreed to meet with 
me as my first participant. From then, I was able to speak to multiple police officers 
through snowball sampling. The challenges in accessing a contentious space as a 
researcher shed light on how my personal identity has shaped my research. Being an 
outsider to the law enforcement context did not induce trust from the police officers I 
spoke with. Similarly, in the year it took to get access, I revised how I presented my 
research objectives to the police officers in order to help them see the value for them with 
this research (i.e., improvements and support for their technological and data-driven 
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practices). Subsequently, once I was in with a couple of the police participants, it became 
easier to convince other police officers to participate because they were aware that I have 
been speaking with their colleagues already. To demonstrate how aggressively I had to 
seek out opportunities to speak with police officers, I even conducted one of my 
interviews in a church parking lot spontaneously, after getting pulled over for speeding 
and convincing the officer to speak with me about my work. However, due to the limited 
nature of my site access, participants often spoke to me in a constrained, and sometimes, 
defensive manner. Throughout the data-collection, it was evident that I, as researcher, 
was an outsider to them, which undermined participant’s candidness. Given this, I did not 
always explicitly discuss certain sensitive issues around police and their technology use 
(e.g., specific details of their technology and data use, social criticisms towards police), 
depending on the participants’ demeanor. It is also important to note that the participants 
I did recruit were mostly public-facing agents, who had a range of training around how to 
talk to the public around contentious issues. 
Participants and Data Collection  
I conducted 16 semi-structured interviews (98 minutes, on average) with MMPD 
members, including three civilians, three on-the-ground officers, three detectives, two 
lieutenants, two sergeants, and two captains across three of the six districts of MMPD. 
The civilian participants worked directly with data at the Information and Intelligence 
Center, while the sworn officers often held multiple responsibilities in terms of working 
with data and policing.  
I conducted the interviews with each participant using a protocol focused on the 
nature of the participants’ work, their roles in the organization, and how the participants 
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understood their work to fit into the mission of the organization; the different 
technologies and data sources they use in their work; how they collect, extract, analyze 
and explore data; the ways they make decisions with or without that data; and the ways 
that the data they use relates to the mission of the organization—the rationality behind 
data-driven policing; and their experiences of the challenges and benefits of technology 
and data use. I continually transcribed interviews to facilitate concurrent analysis.  
In addition to the interviews, we conducted 55 hours of observations, including 
community-police meetings, public safety meetings and training, and accompanying 
police during their patrols to understand their work’s breadth and context. The 
observations were conducted from September 2016 to July 2017. These observations 
focused on who attended these meetings, their roles in the communities, what kinds of 
information and data the police shared, what kinds of questions and concerns were raised 
by the community members and police officers. For ride alongs with patrol officers, my 
observations focused on understanding police officers’ workflow, the different ways 
technology in their cars facilitated their work, as well as the challenges and workaround 
police employ in conducting their calls.  
I analyzed data iteratively and inductively [Corbin & Strauss, 2008]. The initial 
open coding foregrounded what a data-driven approach to policing meant to our 
participants, which lead to five overarching categories related to police’s technology and 
data related challenges. Through iterative memoing and axial coding, I identified three 
sets of challenges MMPD navigate during data use as well as the role of data as it 
supports or thwarts police work.  
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3.3 Phase 3: Police Accountability and Data 
In this final phase, I conducted a field study in the Midwest region with law 
enforcement, community and activist stakeholders. The focus of this study was to 
understand how different stakeholders conceptualize and experience police accountability 
and the challenges and opportunities of data use in mitigating issues around police 
accountability. While I was able to use my connections with the police from the second 
study to recruit police participants, I did face some minor challenges in accessing 
activists as well. This was primarily with abolitionist activists, who deeply question the 
legitimacy of the police. While these activists did speak with me, a couple of them were 
hesitant and one of them was somewhat aggressive around my research with the police. 
From their perspective, researching with the police in this research setting could be 
considered “complicit.” However, in response to that critique, this work has ultimately 
been an attempt to study power up. As police officers who hold high levels of power in 
society, it is important to understand the challenges they experience in using technology 
in their work and the related sociotechnical implications. Studying the police and 
community experiences gives this work a more robust vantage point to discuss the 
problems around data-driven police accountability. Moreover, this final study gives voice 
to the power disparate groups in the conversations that shape data-driven policing 
accountability that are often not placed in conversation with the police. Subsequently, it 
is important to note that there were several activists, community members, and police 
officers in this study who expressed that they saw research like this as necessary and 
helpful in advancing the conversations and progress toward police accountability. 
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The restrictions around my recruiting in all these various groups was also 
apparent in what kinds of data collection activities I could engage in. While initially I had 
wanted to conduct focus groups with these various stakeholders, it became clear that 
without organizational approval, I did not have the leverage to schedule these participants 
to show up. Similarly, after initial research design, it was also apparent that several of the 
police and activist participants would not feel comfortable participating in a shared 
spaces, which is why one-on-one interviews provided me at the best chance of collecting 
data on their authentic experiences. 
Participants and Data Collection 
I conducted 16 semi-structured interviews, which lasted 92 minutes on average. 
Participants were recruited from the local law enforcement agencies, neighborhood crime 
watch organizations, and activist groups predominantly from the Midwest region.  
I wanted to speak to groups of people that regularly engage with and are impacted by the 
local police, in order to understand the ways these perspectives shaped police 
accountability and the role of data.  
The interviews were conducted throughout the city, at police headquarters, local 
coffee shops, or on campus. The interviews were conducted using a protocol focused on 
the nature of the participant’s work, their role in their organizations and the community, 
their experiences and perceptions of police accountability, the different technologies and 
data sources they utilize in their work; the ways that data use relates to holding police 
accountable and the related challenges and benefits around such contentious and political 
issues. While the interviews all followed the same line of inquiry, I created three different 
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versions of the interview protocols to address the underlying assumptions of police’s 
legitimacy in these various stakeholders’ eyes (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Phase 3 Study Participants 
Stakeholder Group Identify As Participant Numbers 
Police* (5 participants) MMPD P1, P4, P9, P11, P12 
Activist** (5 participants) Reformer P2, P15 
Abolitionist P3, P8, P13 
Community*** (6 
participants) 
Strong Police Support P6, P7, P14 
Critical Support P5, P10, P16 
*Police: these participants were revisited from the second study, and included detectives, 
street officers, and lieutenants. 
**Activist: these participants were active in at least one local activist organization around 
police brutality and race-related issues. While most of these participants are from and 
work in the Midwest region, one activist was based in Austin, TX. While all of these 
participants were highly critical of the police and their practices, three of the five 
participants described themselves as abolitionists, who do not believe that the police are a 
legitimate and needed part of society because of the history and current practices of 
systemic and embedded racism. These participants were recruited from local activist 
meetings as well as through snowball sampling. 
**Community: these participants were recruited local Crime Watch chapters and police-
community meetings. I wanted to get the perspectives of community members, who 
choose to engage with the local police to both understand their motivation to engage with 
the police as well as how they perceive issues around police accountability. Three of the 
six participants were staunch police supporters, whereas the rest were a bit more critical 
of the police, but not completely opposed to the police’s existence. 
Design Brainstorming Activity 
Towards the end of the interview session, the participants were also given two 
scenarios (see Appendix) depicting the limitations of data use in police accountability 
work. These scenarios were developed in consultation with two police officers and two 
activists. The first scenario focused on demonstrating how data fails to depict police 
activity and impact in a meaningful way from the police perspective. The second scenario 
illustrated how decisions around collecting and using data are inaccessible to the 
community, raising questions around how data use perpetuates existing inequalities for 
marginalized communities. These scenarios were used to spark conversations and 
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brainstorming around possible, future uses and practices around data to support principles 
like accountability. I continually transcribed interviews to facilitate concurrent analysis.   
Data Analysis 
I analyzed data iteratively and inductively [Corbin & Strauss, 2008]. The initial 
open coding foregrounded what police accountability means to different participants, 
which led six overarching categories related to how data stands to be a function of power. 
Through iterative memoing and axial coding, I identified three categories of ways data 
use perpetuates power disparities for these groups of participants. These categories were 
then related to how my participants saw data supporting more accountable futures around 
police. Because the sample for this research was comprised of a heterogeneous group of 
stakeholders with varying backgrounds, jobs, and agendas, analysis of this research 
focused on how police accountability was specifically experienced in various ways by 
different groups of people in society. Consistent themes around police responsibility, 
responsiveness, and justice rose through this analysis, but with a highly disparate range of 
issues for different participants. I analyzed the different perspectives on these themes by 
memoing how stakeholders experienced issues around power and social disparities. 
Ultimately, the analysis was conducted with a focus on how stakeholders with highly 
unequal power disparities and social standing experience and navigate data-driven 
policing, as well as the possible design spaces to mitigate those disparities. Because of 
the research goal of understanding and mitigating existing power disparities, this analysis 
focused on giving voice to stakeholders without the same level of power in data-driven 
policing.  
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Chapter 4: Mythologies of Data-Driven Technologies and Practices 
4.1 Research Context 
Helping Hands6 is one of a relatively small number of nonprofit organizations 
using data-driven tools such as business intelligence (BI) technology, and the particular 
data needs and pressures in the nonprofit context highlight challenges in how data-driven 
work is handled. Helping Hand is a large, local affiliate of a national human services 
organization that assists low–income populations through a range of programs and 
services:  
• Business Services: Helping Hand’s business services department operates small 
businesses with employees who are often clients of the organization. The 
information management needs of this division include employee scheduling, 
production, inventory, and revenue.  
• Mission Services: Although all departments operate within the same, overarching 
mission, the mission services department offers a variety of programs to support 
the resiliency of their clients. This department relies on information management 
to understand the impact that the organization has on clients. Significant 
information challenges center around questions about how to assess the impact of 
its programs and what information should be collected to do so.  
• Education Services. The education services department at Helping Hand 
manages charter schools for low–income, at–risk youth. Their information needs 
include demographic information about their student population, class scheduling, 
                                                 
6 The name of the organization and all of its internal departments have been anonymized. 
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records of student attendance and achievement, job placement, and salary of 
placement.  
In early 2013, Helping Hand was awarded a small grant to fund the purchase of 
50 licenses for the data-driven system Domo, as well as salary support for a business 
intelligence staff position. The primary motivation for the adoption of Domo was to 
promote a “culture of data” within the organization, to support their actions “using sound 
evidence” [P12]. Since the goal behind data-driven tool adoption was to aggregate data 
across several departments and systems to enable a centralized view, the BI Manager held 
numerous individual meetings and focus groups with various organizational stakeholders 
to identify and prioritize key metrics, start to wrangle data from across a breadth of 
sources into their data warehouse, and coordinate end-user training. Based on usage log 
data at the time of the interviews in the fall of 2014, Helping Hand estimated that of the 
50 licenses that were purchased, Domo had 15 daily or weekly users; 15 monthly users 
(accessed primarily for monthly reporting activities), 5 users who had not logged in since 
their initial training; and 15 users who were still waiting for their data to be added to or 
configured in the backend data warehouse.  
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Figure 1: Domo Dashboards 
 
Note. A: Dashboards in Domo are customizable to provide snapshots of aggregated views of data. B: 
Aggregate views in Domo provide high-level visualizations of data (e.g., Resolution rate by country). C: 
From the aggregate view, users can drill down into quantitative data with more granularity. 
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Each Domo user accesses data via a dashboard, initially setup by the manager of 
BI (e.g., Figure 1a). The dashboard is tiled with “cards” that represent a query performed 
on the data at different levels. There are multiple levels of granularity that can be offered 
as filters and thresholds are customizable. Clicking on a card reveals an aggregate–level 
view of the data resulting from a given filter or query, offering high-level, trends and 
patterns analysis (e.g., Figure 1b). Clicking further on the aggregate-level view accesses 
the drill down, which provides more granularity to the quantitative data (e.g., Figure 1c).  
Domo is currently used at the highest levels of Helping Hand management and 
across the leadership of all departments. Other BI software is used—with varying degrees 
of success and varying degrees of redundancy—across different subsets of departments. 
Education services, for example, also uses Tableau. As suggested by previous research, 
participants in all departments used their BI system(s) as one small part of a broader 
ecology of information management tools—using various Excel spreadsheets, Outlook 
Address books, and paper-based systems to accommodate the needs and individual styles 
of their knowledge work [Kidd, 1994; Voida et. al. 2011].  
4.2 Results 
In the following sections, I introduce four core mythologies: data-driven, 
predictive and proactive, shared accountability, and inquisitiveness. Participants most 
frequently experienced these mythologies in terms of organizational values, both 
instrumental and terminal [Hannula & Pirttimaki, 2003]. These mythologies align with 
the common marketing of big data and business intelligence. Yet, through the discussion 
of each mythology, I highlight the ways in which the enactment of each is problematized 
by recurring disconnects between aggregate views of data and its drill-down in business 
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intelligence systems. These disconnects relate to participants’ understandings of what it 
means for data to be actionable and valid for data-driven decision making.  
Note that the participants frequently used the phrase ‘drill down’ both in a literal 
sense—to use the drill down feature in the BI tool to get finer granularity quantitative 
data—and also, more commonly, in a metaphorical sense—to get more information that 
does not actually exist in their BI system. I use the term ‘drill down’ in the same multi-
faceted fashion.  
Data-Driven  
The upper- and middle- level management participants at Helping Hand all speak 
positively and optimistically about the organization’s ability to use data moving forward 
to improve program strategies, personnel evaluations, and workflow to serve their 
overarching mission better than before. Yet, participants have differing and sometimes 
conflicting perspectives about what kinds of data should be considered legitimate for 
substantiating the organization’s impact and/or actionable for decision making.  
Most participants conveyed a significant inclination towards using quantitative 
data to “prove” the effectiveness of their individual performance or the impact of the 
organization’s work. For these participants, quantitative data is seen as the only 
acceptable indicator or “picture” of performance for many stakeholders:  
It’s really a prove-it-to-me type of mentality and I think its data that’s 
going to help us do that. [P13]  
So that’s what we are going to try to use to the data to really drive us, and 
you can’t quantify everything, that’s just the reality, we are aware of 
that… but it does paint a pretty nice picture. [P3]  
From the participants’ perspectives, quantitative data “proves” impact whereas 
qualitative data helps people “connect emotionally” to the mission of the organization: 
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“We want them to… connect emotionally to what we are doing. So… we tell specific 
stories” [P17].  
Most participants do not explicitly point to qualitative data as a legitimate basis 
for data-driven decision making. For these individuals, qualitative data-driven decision 
making isn’t authoritatively substantiated, it is “just based on… anecdote” [P12].  
Only one participant articulated a view of qualitative data as being a “somewhat” 
legitimate form of empirical data for serving as the basis of data-driven decision making. 
He describes qualitative data as “observational” and “unstructured”:  
There is data input to every decision but some of it like I say is not in 
digital form, it’s just observation, observational data… So that’s 
somewhat data driven but [it’s] unstructured data. And so that generates 
another conversation or decision point. [P6] 
Here, though, the strongest hedge in the participant’s language isn’t related to the 
qualitative nature of the data but the fact that the data is not in digital form. He describes 
the use of observational, unstructured data as actionable because it enables him to take 
action, for example to have a follow-up conversation. Other participants questioned 
whether data had been appropriately vetted and whether they were a reasonable basis for 
communication and decision making if they were not included in Domo.  
Although most participants did not explicitly identify qualitative data as being a 
legitimate basis for being data-driven, nearly all participants recounted experiences of 
data-driven decision making that centered around the use qualitative data. P11, for 
example, reflected on an instance in which he wanted to troubleshoot production issues 
and expressed frustration that the data available to him in the BI system lacked the 
qualitative, “human element” that he wanted:  
I can see if, you know, you’re missing [production] because you don’t 
have enough people producing or the people you do have producing are 
51 
producing at half. And then when I am, you know, coaching… there is 
also that human element: “Well there was a death in that family, you 
know, I lost two people, I haven’t been able to replace them yet. I’m 
working on that.” That, you know, usually good reasons behind it and 
they’re addressing it and they get right back up but, you know, if I could 
drill a little bit deeper. [P11] 
This participant explains how quantitative data is used for keeping track of their 
production, but he wishes he could drill down “deeper,” beyond the quantitative data in 
the system to qualitative data that could explain the context behind the numbers. In order 
to “drill down” to the depth that he needs, this participant has to speak to the site leaders 
to incorporate the “human element” into his understanding. The “drill down” data that he 
seeks is not actually captured in the BI tool—nor could it easily be given the quantitative 
emphasis of existing BI tools. Here, the BI system seems to exacerbate the uncertainty 
that the participants experience in considering whether qualitative data are a legitimate 
basis for being data-driven.  
Among the participants at Helping Hand, Domo is held up as an embodiment of 
the promise of the data-driven organization, particularly as it represents the aggregation 
of their activity: “At the core of our approach, one of our central tenets is measuring 
outcomes with data and with this system, Domo, that aggregates everything we do…” 
[P5]. Yet, the aggregation of data in Domo supports only part of being actionable in their 
work. This same participant continues to emphasize the complementary need to “drill 
down” to the context surrounding the individual clients who are being served. And, he 
emphasizes that the aggregate views of quantitative data are most valuable when they are 
used in service of the “drill down” views of data that, ideally, enable them to understand 
why an individual has been successful or not:  
Our ability to measure outcomes dramatically affects how we can serve an 
individual. So knowing across the board where we are successful 
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generally speaking and being able to drill down and look at on an 
individual basis how that success came about and we can do that. And that 
supports our mission in everything from the heart to the wallet… [P5] 
For these participants, the relationship between being data driven and being 
actionable manifests through the conflicted interplay between quantitative and qualitative 
data. The language that the participants are almost uniformly using to characterize the 
relationship is a metaphor borrowed from the business intelligence tool they use—a 
relationship between the aggregate and the drill down. Yet, intriguingly, while the 
participants speak of the drill down as ideally providing qualitative, actionable evidence 
of the context surrounding the quantitative data, Domo (as with nearly all analytics tools) 
only provides quantitative “drill down” data, the individual-level quantitative data that is 
the basis for the aggregate-level quantitative data.  
While the performance and legitimacy of the organization is supported by 
aggregate views of quantitative data, being actionable is supported by individual-level, 
qualitative “drill down” data that is important for responding to the unique circumstances 
of individuals. The participants use both qualitative and quantitative data but are unsure 
whether qualitative data is considered legitimate since this qualitative data doesn’t 
actually exist in the business intelligence system. And it is frequently not even found in 
digital form. As such, its legitimacy is—at best—contested; at worst, the validity of this 
data as an actionable basis for decision making is threatened.  
Predictive and Proactive  
As participants work towards achieving a “culture of data” [P1] within their 
organization, they envision that a predictive use of data will also enable them to be more 
proactive. As they ramp up their business intelligence efforts, one participant 
characterizes the trajectory towards being proactive as the “real value” of these systems:  
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I think we are on the cusp… of shifting from a reactive look at data to a 
predictive data…. The real value comes… when we can actually start to 
predict things that are going to happen and then intervene before they do. 
[P8]  
According to this participant, the “real value” of business intelligence doesn’t 
come just from the ability to aggregate historical data, but from being able to predict what 
is going to happen so he can act on it. This predictive capability, he continues, comes 
from being able to compare the drill-down “characteristics” of individuals with aggregate 
views of data, asking questions like: “What are the common characteristics of people who 
have graduated? Who have dropped out?” [P8]. Yet, to act on these aggregate views of 
data on behalf of individuals means walking a fine line between capitalizing on the 
predictive capabilities of the BI system and respecting the lived experiences of their 
clients:  
If we say that if you are an African American male, that’s 23 or under, 
who has two kids, you know, who comes to us with fewer than 10 credits, 
you are highly unlikely to graduate. Right? It doesn’t mean that the next 
African American male that shares these characteristics is not going to 
graduate but what we can do is start to surround him with additional 
support early to raise his chances right? So it’s… it is profiling... but it’s 
what we hope is profiling in a really, really positive manner. [P8] 
The participant recognizes the disconnect between the quantitative, aggregated data and 
the individuals with real relationships and struggles that stand to be singled out but also 
surrounded with additional support as a result of predictive analytics. Despite the 
recognition of this uncomfortable disconnect, and without clear answers about the right 
path forward or the right language to use to describe the proactive work that is likely to 
happen at the drill-down, individual level, participants are still keen about the proactive 
use of predictive data to guide their actions as they serve their clients. 
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Shared Accountability 
For the informants at Helping Hand, a “culture of data” should foster shared 
accountability among individuals across the organization as well as with external funders 
and community members. Since the mission of all their departments is to assist low–
income populations, one informant points out how important it is to keep all the programs 
accountable to the shared organizational mission:  
My job is to use all of these programs plus all the resources that exist in 
[Helping Hand]… using sound evidence based programming…. It is all 
these contributing. We have to work together or it doesn’t work. [P12] 
The value of shared accountability is manifested in many of the informants’ work 
practices, but most significantly in data reviews:  
Data reviews we started because, it’s actually fundamental to, I think, the 
model. We want everybody to be accountable for their own data and to 
understand their own data. [P12]  
Most informants view data reviews as an opportunity to address their performance and 
any issues associated with it in a transparent manner with other members of the 
organization, providing some additional context to the quantitative data.  
While the shared visibility of data and the open discussion in data reviews may 
enable valuable forms of professional facework, it may also foster competitiveness within 
some subcultures internal to the organization:  
They are hyper competitive… and they're like one of the most data crazy 
groups that you ever see… so like data hungry. [They] will go through and 
say, “Well, I had this percentage of my students earn credit this past term 
year and you only had 10% lower than I did…” And I’ll sit in meetings 
and they’ll just totally call each other out… It’s crazy! [P4] 
From a management perspective, access to aggregate views of data also enables the 
leadership to identify outliers in the productivity of their workforce and coordinate 
mentors and other resources to help address whatever productivity gap might exist:  
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If we see an issue at one school and success at another, we can say to 
them, the school leader, that’s struggling, “Hey, you need to go talk to the 
school leader who is knocking it out of the park with that; and let’s do 
some coaching there. [P8] 
Although the focus here is on the employee rather than the client, there is the 
same emphasis on understanding and supporting the individual who underlies the data. 
Here, aggregate views of data are helpful in comparing employee productivity, but the 
drill down views of quantitative data are more deeply understood and acted on in 
conjunction with extensive qualitative data provided through the mentoring process, 
outside the BI tool.  
But as with the multiple tenors of data use that emerge from shared accountability 
in data review meetings, there are also multiple tenors of data use resulting from the 
shared accountability of data with management. The middle- and upper- level 
management participants raise questions about how data should relate to employees’ 
incentives and evaluation. Here, “performance” is used to reflect the more qualitative or 
subjective perceptions about employees’ work whereas “outcomes” are reflections of 
work that have been metricized for the business intelligence system:  
I read a quote the other day…. It basically said something to the effect 
of… you cannot connect pay with performance because performance is 
circumstantial. But I think you can connect pay and data and incentives to 
outcomes… right? So performance and outcomes, I think, are different... 
Our perceived performance of something… our perception of somebody’s 
performance could be totally different… but the outcomes could still be 
great. Or my perception is that the performance is great but the outcome is 
horrible…. And so that’s what we’d like to do, is really make sure 
however you decide to achieve your goal… [P3]  
This participant is still wrestling with the sometimes-conflicting forms of data that he 
receives about employees’ work and acknowledges that observational data might not 
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align with the quantitative data in the system. But he is still optimistic about finding some 
evidence-based means to evaluate employees against their goals.  
Here, aggregate views of data enables the management to identify employees 
whose productivity levels are outliers. The disconnect in being actionable based on 
aggregate views of data stems from the lack of additional, contextual information in the 
BI system, which the participants then have to seek elsewhere. It is the conjunction of the 
quantitative data within and qualitative data outside the BI system that enables 
participants to be actionable. More generally, the mythology or desired value of shared 
accountability raises questions about how different individuals with access to data treat 
the human who underlies the data.  
Inquisitiveness 
As more data is integrated into the data warehouse and as more users have access 
through Domo to the data that they ideally want to use to make decisions and act on 
them, the participants hope that the system will enable them to be more inquisitive about 
the data. A few participants reported already having conducted hypothesis-driven mini 
experiments by studying aggregated, longitudinal data for certain trends. In one instance, 
the participant created a card in Domo to “prove” the effect of missing quota on 
production levels:  
I have a rolling twelve month card that runs production along with the 
sales… and the reason why we did that was because our production… was 
super low and we weren’t making quota. And we were trying to prove to 
the regional managers, well if you make quota, the next week immediately 
your sales are up. [P1]  
The readiness-at-hand of the data, in this case, empowered this user to ask questions of 
the data that they were curious about. Another participant discusses a similar hypothesis-
driven study of data to answer his question about whether more communication about the 
57 
mission of the organization makes their customers want to donate by rounding up their 
payment at the stores:  
One thing I’m curious about is that the stores that have that increased 
communication, are they… are people rounding up any more frequently at 
those stores because they’re theoretically learning more about the mission 
than they would at stores where we don’t have those communication 
efforts? The reason why I’m interested in that is because there could be a 
couple of different hypothesis on that… This data can help us to… prove 
that one way or another. [P13] 
The ability to act on a value of inquisitiveness, however, relies on a certain level of 
technical and information literacy. Approximately 75% of all cards seen by all but one 
users are created by the IT or BI staff, who identify data sources, select a visualization 
widget, and configure the scope of the visualization. The two example mini-studies 
described earlier both rely on data presented in cards that had already been pre-
configured in ways that were suitable for the questions they wanted to ask. Individuals 
who create their own cards have done so only after requesting and receiving multiple 
hours of one-on-one training from the IT or BI staff.  
Creating a new card, however, requires some degree of scripting skills. At the 
time of the study, only one user had created his own cards by modifying the scripting 
from existing cards; the BI staff is unsure whether his cards have been configured 
correctly. If inquisitiveness persists as being an organizational value, it is one that likely 
will privilege users who learn new skills to support the dynamic creation of new cards to 
answer new kinds of questions.  
Users who do not yet have these skills or who prefer to explore their data in other 
ways—the majority of our participants—either collect data in, sometimes redundantly, or 
export data to Excel spreadsheets. They feel it enables a richer and more accessible set of 
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features for sense making than the drill down that is the sole analytic feature possible 
given a pre-defined set of cards:  
I can’t look at this [card] formatting. For me, I find it too hard. I think this 
is my problem, not the system’s problem…. If I am not in control of the 
columns… it’s too hard to look at, so I reformat everything…. [P17] 
Most of the participants noted that their BI tools, including Domo, do not provide 
sufficient or sufficiently accessible control and flexibility for exploring and 
understanding their data. Even with a general understanding of the affordances of 
business intelligence tools, there is still a perceived disconnect between the resources and 
expertise required to make use of the pre-defined aggregate views of data and the 
dynamically-explorable data, ideally something beyond the drill down. In order to be 
inquisitive and ask questions of their data beyond the visualization widgets currently set 
up in their dashboards, the BI tools assume both scripting and data literacy skills beyond 
the current expertise of these users. Fostering inquisitiveness and supporting sensemaking 
through different drill downs is beyond the scope of accessible features for the majority 
of participants at Helping Hand. 
4.3 Discussion 
Mythologies of Data-Driven Systems and The Space for Action  
Morgan’s work on organizational metaphors refers to quantitative data as one of 
the mythologies shaping organizational life by providing a semblance of rationality to 
decision making [Morgan et. al., 1997]. He claims that quantitative data in formal 
organizations plays the same role as magic in primitive societies, enabling clear-cut 
decisions to be made in situations that might otherwise be open-ended. Even though these 
techniques don’t reduce risks, the mythology of rationality as supported by quantitative 
analysis provides credibility to organizational actions. Similarly, the mythology of big 
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data is believed to provide higher levels of intelligence with an aura of objectivity, truth 
and accuracy [boyd & Crawford, 2012]. These mythologies surrounding data compel us 
to question the values and biases that are embedded in organizational data and to 
critically examine the data that becomes legitimized through organizational action—what 
data is collected, what data is digitized, what data is aggregated and visualized in 
business intelligence systems [Crawford, 2013; Manovich, 2011]. It also compels us to 
question what kinds of action it may support or thwart. 
If users consider the data in business intelligence systems to be the only valid 
representations of organizational ground truth for publically admissible data-driven 
decision making, as data reflecting participants’ uncertainty about qualitative and 
unstructured data suggests, these biases stand to propagate through their actions. Just as 
the interplay of inclusion and exclusion of data in measurements can create a space for 
possible action [Crawford, 2013], the space for action within an organization can be 
constrained by the data and visualizations contained in the business intelligence system. 
Especially for a human services organization serving at-risk individuals, it is important to 
question what data is included and excluded from measurement to understand how the 
values embodied by data shape rational action and organizational culture. 
4.4 Conclusion 
For the participants at Helping Hand, the mythologies of business intelligence are 
experienced as powerful commitments to a set of organizational values. But as they 
attempt to enact these values through the use of BI tools, the full complement of data that 
they need to translate data into action are not supported by their information systems. 
And when data are not in the systems, there is clear uncertainty about whether data 
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“counts” as a legitimate basis for data-driven decision making. Just as workflow systems 
were found to overconstrain work practices in organizations, this contemporary class of 
system also overconstrains work practices and ways of thinking about the work 
[Winograd, 1987]. The mythologies of business intelligence scope data in and out of the 
system, scope understandings about legitimacy, and scope the actions that are made based 
on data.  
In this research, I have made the following contributions:  
• Identified four core mythologies that characterize an organizational culture of 
data: data-driven, predictive and proactive, shared accountability and 
inquisitiveness;  
• Identified breakdowns in data-driven decision making that stem from disconnects 
between the aggregate and drill down views of data in data-driven systems;  
• Provided empirical evidence of the epistemological of data-driven systems 
propagating into confusion about what data is and should be considered legitimate 
for data-driven decision making; and  
• Offered the first case study of the use of business intelligence and data analytics 
in a nonprofit organization, highlighting tensions in BI use that arise from the 
human-services context.  
This empirical evidence suggests that the enactment of mythologies surrounding a 
data–driven culture require more comprehensive support for diverse types and 
combinations of data than are currently supported by this organization’s ecosystem of 
information management tools. For the participants at Helping Hand, when they “drill 
down,” they want to understand the “human element” represented by the data and they 
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rely on that human element to help them know how to translate data into action. Given 
the recognition that there is a human being who underlies data, the question of how to act 
becomes a fundamentally moral one. And the design challenge we face is to re-envision 
the ecology of information management systems in ways that enable organizations to 
legitimize data that is most meaningful for being actionable, where what it means to be 
actionable may very well hinge on the moral treatment of the individuals who underlie 
data. 
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Chapter 5: Challenges and Limitations in Data-Driven Policing 
5.1 Research Context 
MMPD is the law enforcement agency of one of the most populous cities in the 
Midwest. Their mission focuses on reducing crime and the fear of crime while enhancing 
public safety. MMPD has six service districts, with about 1600 police officers in the 
workforce.  
While MMPD has employed crime data analysts for over a decade, in early 2016, 
under a new administration, MMPD doubled down on efforts to be data-driven. This 
included revamping the Information and Intelligence Center, which employs different 
kinds of analysts (crime analysis, GIS, internet crimes, social media, real-time camera 
surveillance, and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) for the FBI). The Center is where 
requests are made for information for supporting ongoing investigations, writing funding 
grants, and developing new initiatives. Community members also send requests for city’s 
crime data.  
Through interviews and observations, my participants considered MMPD to be in 
the “infancy” stage of adopting data-driven policing. These participants echoed that their 
efforts towards data-driven policing were hindered by the lack of budget for 
technological and human resources. MMPD, at the time of our study, employed only 
three civilian data analysts, while most of the other analysts in the Information and 
Intelligence Center were sworn officers, who were either interested in technology or on 
“light duty” because of an injury, or held multiple positions in the organization. Though 
MMPD does have a small in-house IT department, an external, third-party agency 
controls and maintains their IT infrastructure. Several of my participants expressed 
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dissatisfaction about how the external agency handles the police’s technology needs 
because of incompatible IT best practices, lack of control over technology decisions, and 
organizational politics.  
MMPD has four key data-driven practices relevant to their work, which I will 
discuss in turn. First, Compare Statistics, more commonly known as CompStat7, is an 
adopted framework developed by New York Police Department for strategic problem 
solving and increased accountability [Weisburd et. al., 2003]. At MMPD, district 
commanders present detailed crime reports about their districts (provided by the analysts) 
to the chief of police once a month, where the administration makes decisions about 
resource allocations and ways of addressing crime. Second, Social Disorder Index (SDI) 
is part of the data used during CompStat meetings that guides decision-making. SDI 
divides the city into small grids (250 ft by 250 ft) and maps crime and other emergency 
incidents (i.e., fire department, emergency medical services, high-risk SWAT areas). 
These incidents are then each given scores based on the gravity of the incident (e.g., 
crimes against a person or property, mental illness, drug overdose). SDI is meant to help 
the police administration identify and address underlying patterns in high crime areas. 
Third, “heat list” analysis includes a running, monthly list of repeat victims and offenders 
in the districts. Lastly, community programs are implemented based on data about the 
area’s needs. For instance, by looking at where the most juvenile crime occurs, MMPD 
was able to choose a location to organize a youth basketball league to provide better 
community interactions with the police.  
                                                 
7 https://compstat.nypdonline.org/ 
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MMPD’s data collection includes, but is not limited to, computer-aided dispatch 
system, crime reporting system, license plate readers, closed circuit (CCTV) cameras 
(including collaborations with private businesses), social media, geographic information 
systems, and in-house forums for information dissemination. MMPD also collaborates 
with the local Fusion Center, which is a federally operated data exchange center to aid in 
police investigations. 
5.2 Results 
In the following sections, I identify three key challenges centered on MMPD’s 
data-driven efforts: data-driven frictions, precarious and inactionable insights, and 
police metis concerns. These challenges shed light on how MMPD navigates new work 
possibilities afforded through data collection and analysis and balancing these new data 
forms with the human-element in police work. Through the discussion of these 
conversations, I highlight how data-driven challenges problematize police work.  
Data-Driven Frictions 
Within MMPD, there are two approaches regarding how technology and data can 
mitigate pressing social concerns. The first data-driven approach supports officers by 
creating and using data to help legitimize decisions and position practices as arguably 
objective and unbiased. The second data-driven approach modifies existing police 
practice towards the tenets of community policing, by not focusing on solely enforcing 
the law, but by using data to provide a proactive policing orientation. Data is used to 
identify underlying issues fostering crime in order to attempt to address those issues 
through community collaborations. For most of my participants, the first is the current 
status quo, whereas, the second approach is an idealized vision some police want to 
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progress towards. In the following section, I discuss the conversations policing agents 
have around the role of data and how these technological visions impact police practices. 
Here, police officers face challenges with new forms of data that offer new police goals, 
however, because of their limited resources, they experience tensions in choosing which 
agendas to actively work towards.  
Data for Legitimization Measures  
As MMPD works to understand and address criticisms about perpetuating social 
inequalities, police officers are thinking through their own work and role. In my case 
study, police agents predominantly use data to legitimize existing practices and decisions. 
For instance, a patrol officer in our study echoed a widespread sentiment about data 
collection efforts as a mechanism to “CYA”3 (i.e., cover your ass) in case there were any 
complaints filed against the officers and their work. For instance, during my 
observations, a police officer made timestamped comments within their dispatch system 
on the laptop after a store manager called about theft. The officer explained her 
documentation as a way for her supervisor to retrieve the officer’s side of the events in 
case a complaint by the store manager was made against MMPD. Similarly, another 
patrol officer would mark their location while driving through areas where community 
members had requested more patrol in order to provide data about the numbers of police 
officers in that area.  
Police also use data to garner public support for their practices and actions 
because of data’s perceived objectivity.  
…with [data] we get more buy-in, we get more support…. I think that's an 
effective result of data because again the community they get objective 
statistics from us now. It's more transparent for them [community 
members], that's one of the goals. [P6]  
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… one thing that [the police department] hope[s] to do with data is to have 
it more readily available for the public when incidents happen…to readily 
share accurate data with the public is crucial sometimes in keeping that 
transparency and accountability with the department. [P4]  
As police begin using data as a mechanism for transparency and accountability with the 
public, this raises questions about how and who collects, analyses, and presents data. 
These questions about what the data does and does not depict have to be addressed in 
order to better support efforts of improving police and community relations. Likewise, 
more data does not necessarily equate to more transparent and accountable police 
forces—for instance, while initial reports suggested bodycams influenced police to be 
less aggressive with the police and cause a decline in reports against the police [Ariel et. 
al. 2016; Stanley, 2013], research also showed the ways in which police shape recordings 
(i.e., shutting off cameras, placing evidence) [Ariel et. al. 2015].  
Data for Proactive, Community-Oriented Measures  
Next, I demonstrate how the proactive policing approach is part of the data-driven 
conversation at MMPD. Most of the participants from the Information and Intelligence 
Center envisioned using data to proactively address social issues and to change on-the-
ground and administrative practices. One of the data-driven practices implemented by 
MMPD is the SDI, as introduced in the Research Context. Rather than just enforcing the 
law, the SDI aims to help police understand the prevalence of criminal and social issues 
across the city. In particular, the tool is meant to help the police administration identify 
and address underlying issues of high crime areas.  
You have to have all three things to have the crime occur. […] if we take 
any part of that convergence triad away, whether it is education for the 
victim, identifying the suspects early [and] making sure they are not in a 
position to re-offend, or changing the environment then we do not have 
the crime… their goal is to move forward to that predictive end. Right 
now, we’re really providing what has happened in the past… [the data] 
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starts building a better bigger picture of how is that convergence setting 
created. [P12]  
For several MMPD officers, being data-driven enables them to understand what 
comorbid social conditions may underlie the city’s criminal patterns. Besides basing 
resource allocation decisions off of data, community outreach programs created based on 
community needs data. Community outreach at MMPD includes programs for at-risk 
youth to provide positive role-models, fundraising efforts for less advantaged 
communities, conducting community meetings with newer immigrant communities to 
develop trust, and helping community members develop evidence-based neighborhood 
safety strategies. Similarly, the repeat victim and offender heat lists enable officers to 
focus patrols. These data-driven practices, help officers attend to a larger range of issues 
to shift police’s focus towards preventing crime rather than just enforcing the law.  
…you’re not going to arrest your way out of [crime], and we think, in our 
case, certain areas of crime are related to poverty and mental health. [A 
police employee] has access to all social services so when we go in and 
take a bunch of guys to jail, they go in and say [to the remaining family], 
‘we know your primary breadwinner, although [through] illegal 
[activities], is gone, can we help you with food and rent and social 
services’… To connect social services with those people, who would 
retreat to crime otherwise… I do not think the general public understands 
how hard it is to be going in there with a lot of empathy and sympathy, 
and hugs, and at the same time you’re worried about getting shot. 
Ambushed. It is a tough role and I think our officers do a great job with 
it… and it is hard to identify the underlying issues. If it were easy to 
identify, it would already be fixed, this [SDI] data can then help that way. 
[P10]  
SDI is an effort towards a proactive policing mindset that helps shape police agents’ 
crime conceptions to try to proactively address crime’s underlying issues. Data-driven 
practices may alter the way police work within society. Data, as part of the proactive 
mindset, can foster collaborations between various public safety agencies (e.g., 
emergency medical services, fire departments) to depict a more inclusive understanding 
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of the city’s problems that utilize their resources. With this envisioned change, my 
participants grappled with the need to balance the dangers of the job. Within MMPD, 
there is resistance towards a proactive orientation by explaining that policing 
organizations are not equipped to handle solving underlying social issues:  
…with our resources we’re just not designed to handle...we’re not public 
prevention. We [police officers] see the end result. They’re [social 
services] looking at the disease. We can just see and respond to the 
symptoms.” [P4]  
Some police understand their work as reactionary responses to emerging issues 
and position other social services as better suited for treating crime’s underlying 
problems. The conversation within MMPD about these two orientations is in part shaping 
the future of their police work and identity. As MMPD commits more to being data-
driven, police workers grapple with how data and technology can and cannot assuage 
social criticisms, while also inducing reflection on their sociotechnical visions for their 
work.  
Precarious and Inactionable Insights  
Data-driven policing practices are motivated, in part, by police’s desire to make 
decisions that are arguably more objective, impartial, and can be rationalized through 
data. While using collected data can lead to empirical data-driven decisions, there is a 
risk that data-driven insights may still lead to erroneous insights and faulty judgments. In 
this section, I discuss how various kinds of policing agents, from on-the-ground officers 
to data analysts, voice their concerns about how data-driven insights may lead to faulty 
decisions. Disparities in data-driven decision making and insights emerged for my 
participants in two key ways: faulty inferences from and unintended consequences of 
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being data-driven, and unfeasibility of data-driven decisions. I highlight how data literacy 
issues exacerbate such concerns.  
My data suggests that MMPD grapples with understanding the impact of their 
efforts through data. MMPD defined impact as changes to crime patterns, community 
tips, number of people involved in police-community efforts, and other police-
community interactions. For example, a participant from the Information and Intelligence 
Center demonstrates the struggle in correlating improvements in the community with 
their data-driven effort:  
…it is hard to prove…. the Chief is using the data and focusing the efforts 
… I think it is having an impact, but how do you prove that correlation? 
[P10]  
The challenge of faulty inferences and unintended consequences emerged for 
MMPD officers through from data-driven decision making. As mentioned in the 
Research Context, each MMPD district participates in CompStat meetings as a data-
driven accountability mechanism. As MMPD’s police agents use data for decision 
making, disparities in their empirical judgment emerge. For example, an officer 
demonstrated how resource allocation based solely on crime statistics data becomes 
problematic:  
Here, in southwest district, when our crime rate was really low, then [the 
commanders] would adjust the manpower numbers and say, ‘Well, we 
usually like to have 30 officers work in that area. For the last six months, 
crime stats show that the crime is down 50%. Why don’t we bust those 
number of officers down…let’s put them over here where crime is 
rampant.’ That was not a good idea to do. Unfortunately, [with] 
municipalities, that is the way they work. What you always see is those 
numbers start to come back up over there where you just pulled those 
officers… but those crime stats lead to who gets what resources. [P4]  
Data analysis can be insufficient in representing the on-the-ground reality. Other 
examples about faulty, data-driven inferences include targeting officers’ patrol, which 
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failed to incorporate the officers’ lived experience and knowledge about the area, and 
evaluating officers based on the number of arrests and tickets, which is not representative 
of police impact in the community towards reducing crime. As the commanders make 
sense of historical data to justify resource allocation, they stand to make false inferences 
about how criminal patterns will and will not be impacted by changing resource 
allocation, policies, and practices.  
Similarly, MMPD is also navigating how data use creates unintended 
consequences from their data-driven crime interventions. For instance, one officer 
explained a data-driven initiative he undertook to reduce burglaries in a certain area 
during summer:  
…we would tell our officers we want you to work in these areas in this 
particular timeframe for burglaries. Well, burglaries went down for the 
days we had targeted, but what was interesting is that [the new patrol 
patterns] displaced [the crime]. Because on our peak days, officers are out 
there, [and] they’re more visible in these areas in these particular 
timeframes…peak time for burglaries is between eight and noon on 
Wednesday. So, what you see is less burglaries on Wednesday between 
eight and noon. But now, you see more burglaries on Sundays between 
eight and noon. So, we go back and try something else, think about why 
[the burglaries are] happening in the first place. [P2]  
As unplanned consequences emerge, MMPD officers figure out how to adjust their 
approaches for mitigating unwanted outcomes. As police determine how they impact 
crime when they change city conditions, using data to identify crime may actually be 
insufficient in reducing crime. While it would be impossible to think of every 
consequence police decisions can have in the community, this disparity does illuminate 
quantitative data’s insufficiency in representing reality that future efforts can be based off 
of.  
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As police navigate the infancy of their data-driven efforts, they have concerns 
about data literacy, defined as the ability to read, create, and communicate data as 
information. These concerns range from the officers on-the-ground collecting data to 
commanders using data for resource allocations and strategies.  
There is a data disconnect. [Commanders] see it, but they do not 
understand it… They really do not have a background in statistical 
information. [For example,] one of the commanders was presenting the 
SDI data for their district. And we were looking at one of the hotspots. 
And there was a criminal homicide score of 10. And he presented that 
score of 10 as 10 individual criminal homicides in that little 250-foot x 
250-foot area, which actually two criminal homicides happened because 
each one is a score of five. [P15]  
Police decision-makers do not always have a firm grasp of what the data represents when 
making judgments and how those decisions impact communities. Additionally, without a 
top-down push towards data literacy, the efforts to be data-driven remain half-hearted.  
A lack of resources for data-driven efforts, including manpower, technology, and 
data expertise, makes implementing data-driven decision unfeasible. Here, a patrol 
officer reflects on how insights about vehicular accidents in the city are futile because 
their resources for action are limited:  
You cannot really predict the certain mile area of where a car crash will 
occur. We laughed because we were being told that we were going to have 
more directed patrols [meaning that they would get precise traffic 
predictions]. We know [the data] is there, but there isn't really anything we 
can do with it because we do not have the manpower. You can keep telling 
me all along that we are going to have crashes here on the interstate. But if 
there is only two of us working, we cannot be proactive. We are more 
reactive than proactive. [P5]  
Proactive, data-driven efforts do not impact the officers on-the-ground because 
organizations still struggle with insufficient workforce. Similarly, the lack of 
technological and criminology expertise within the organization makes implementing 
certain data-driven insights unlikely. For example, participants echoed frustration with 
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the top management’s commitment to the data-driven efforts as he explained the lack of 
diversified expertise for data analysis:  
Sometimes I do not see the action [from the top management]. When I was 
first hired, we were supposed to build a staff of like ten analysts that were 
from all different walks of the trade. Instead of just having a GIS guy and 
a couple of legacy analysts, getting a couple well-versed criminologists 
involved whether that is from the academic side or working in a police 
force side. I would just like to see a holistic approach to staffing data-
driven ideas… the leadership needs to make the resources available 
instead of just talking about it. [P15]  
Without management’s commitment and specialized experts in data science and 
criminology, their data-driven efforts remain constrained. As MMPD tries to incorporate 
data into their decision-making, the difficulties in implementing insights require 
improved data literacy, and technological and expertise resources.  
Police Metis Concerns 
While participants indicated data helps justify and guide police actions in the face 
of growing social criticisms, concerns about the balance between the role of data and 
experiential, practical knowledge in supporting police work and accountability emerged. 
In this section, I demonstrate how our participants experience the epistemological bias in 
being data-driven, and highlight the ways in which quantitative data is insufficient for 
supporting police work, determining long-term impact on communities, and bolstering 
their accountability efforts.  
Police work entails a deep level of qualitative knowledge, referred to here as 
metis, which includes experiential knowledge, discretion, expert judgment, gut instinct, 
and biases [Goldstein, 1960; Bittner, 1967; Livingston, 1997; Scott, 1998]. For example, 
police judgment is useful when deciding to issue a warning instead of ticket, in building 
relationships and trust in various communities, when dealing with mentally ill 
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individuals, or when dealing with interpersonal conflicts and minor misconducts. My 
participants raised concerns about overreliance on data-based insights that neglected 
police metis. This becomes problematic when data-driven efforts epistemologically favor 
metrics that can be easily quantified over officer’s lived experiences. Examples of 
qualitative knowledge in police include the kinds of conversations and relationships 
police have with community members, the types of individuals police engage with, the 
times and places to patrol accounting for on-the-ground experiences, or how to frame 
police documentation about community interactions. 
Several participants pushed back on data-driven insights and their ability to 
sufficiently inform police work. Because experiential and practical knowledge is essential 
to the service and practices police engage in, MMPD police officers emphasized the 
importance of qualitative knowledge in their work (i.e., experience, knowledge about the 
community, relationships, and gut instinct). MMPD’s police force grapples with 
understanding the changing role of police metis when technology and data do and do not 
support their work. One participant spoke about how he thinks about the role of data in 
relation to the “human element” of their job. Data supplements work but the experiential 
and practical component of police work holds more value because of the way experience 
lends itself to their human-centered work: 
I work almost totally on the data side right now, but I will be the first to 
say that the human side of [policing] is the most important […] The data 
side of it is extremely important too. It can help show the crime that was 
committed. But beyond that there’s still the whole investigative side that 
has to be done where [police] have to engage in that human element to get 
confessions and intel that data can’t provide. There is nothing better than a 
human being doing what they do, especially police officers, out on the 
street, face-to-face contact, talking to people. [P8] 
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Here, P8 refers to engaging with the “human element” as a skill used to derive 
information out of individuals and communities they work with. While most of my 
participants acknowledged data’s potential to support police work, several participants 
were also quick to temper the role of data in comparison to the “human element” of their 
jobs. Similarly, a cybercrimes analyst echoed how important it is for police officers to 
find the middle ground between their own judgment and data: 
Well, we cannot take all threats and all incidents and then put them in one 
predicting police formula. We need worker bees on the ground that take 
these incidents and analyze them from not only a data perspective, but a 
human intel and intention perspective as well. You cannot just police from 
a computer… data doesn’t go take the runs or interact with community 
members, solve their problems, get confessions. So you can’t have 
administrators making decisions on data, [if] they aren’t in the field with 
that human intel, (being data-driven) is not going to happen. [P7]  
Similarly, P7 points out that police work cannot be heavily based on data because of the 
role of human interaction in determining context and “intention.” The human element, to 
my participants, is important in all stages of policing—from taking runs to investigating 
crimes to administrative decision-making, and data-driven strategies bring concerns 
regarding over-reliance on technology. While quantitative data can help police create 
seemingly objective pictures of their actions, the limitations of quantitative data in 
supporting police decision-making and work continue to emerge.  
Another limitation of quantitative data is how the use of technology and data 
impacts police capacities, skills, and communities. From these participants’ perspective, 
being data-driven may over-rely on technology and data in ways detrimental to police 
work and community. For instance, a participant, when speaking about the generational 
gap in technology usage within the organization, voiced his concern about how 
technology’s prevalence shapes and interferes with younger officer’s capacities:  
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…when it comes to the older officers, face to face, boots on their ground, 
real old-fashioned investigation will always, always trump technology... 
Data is just [a] supplement. In the end, a detective still has to exhaust that 
information and go out and interview or do something and find out if this 
is the right person. What I actually worry more about is the younger 
officers who start relying so much on technology. [Younger police officers 
have not learned] how to do that people side of the work. … Sometimes [I 
have to] pull them out of the computer and say, ‘you’ve got a human being 
sitting down at the entrance, who has information, go talk to him.’ Or 
some of the biggest carriers of information for police [are] your drug 
dealers and your prostitutes. The younger officers are not really 
comfortable street wise, with the social dynamic of talking to people. [P8]  
While a few participants echoed concerns about how data-driven strategies impact police 
work, P8 indicated that the “people side” of their job is where police impact their 
communities; quantitative data is insufficient for capturing impact on community 
relationships as the social skills required for policing are at risk for these participants.  
Lastly, quantitative data also falls short in the promises for providing increased 
accountability for police actions and community relationships. While most of my 
participants talked of data and technology as largely objective and neutral, one participant 
directly discussed the biases embedded in data work as well as police work. The 
participant explained how data, curated to be reported, in community meetings can be 
shaped into certain narratives:  
Biggest challenge with data is accuracy. Here’s what’s bad about data: if 
you want the numbers to look higher than what they are, then you’re 
selective about what data you pull. You know, on the local [community] 
level, the numbers are going to say whatever you pull and have them say. 
[P4]  
For this participant, a challenge he sees in quantitative data use in policing is about how 
data is politicized. Data is shaped based on who is collecting, analyzing, curating and 
presenting the data and how. Data use in policing for accountability raises issues of how 
data is used to shape narratives and provide rationality from certain perspectives. While 
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quantitative policing data does provide certain lenses into police action, police’s data-
driven strategies are not designed for improved accountability to the community.  
Big data supports data collection and interpretation of phenomena that can be 
easily quantified, which means it may leave out critical policing knowledge not well 
suited for quantification. Through the conversations surrounding the role of data and 
police metis, MMPD officers question quantitative data’s role and legitimization. As the 
police use technology and data to portray their work practices as objective and neutral, 
they also worry how over-reliance on data devalues their metis and consequently, impacts 
police outcomes, specifically, the police skills and practices fundamental to working with 
human-beings. 
5.3 Discussion 
Data and Police Judgement  
As concerns about police judgment grow in terms of police’s disproportionate and 
negative impact on marginalized communities, data and technology stand to drive 
decision-making and police actions [Morgan et. al. 1997; Manning, 2005; Ericson & 
Haggerty, 1997]. My results indicate that polices’ data use alone is not sufficient to 
support police action and judgment because quantitative data provides rationalities that 
hinders police’s ability to understand marginalized communities’ policing criticisms and 
thus, hampers efforts towards accountability. My research emphasizes the importance of 
understanding in what ways and how data can and cannot support police work.  
Now, I discuss how data could be used more constructively to influence police 
judgment by facilitating collaborations between the police and community to more 
robustly inform police’s preconceptions. First, quantitative data can be helpful in 
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providing aggregated views of social issues that perpetuate criminal patterns. One of the 
frustrations my participants expressed was that while they understand how police actions 
impact communities negatively, directly addressing crimes’ comorbid issues of poverty, 
mental illness, and drug addiction are beyond typical police jurisdiction and training. 
While other scholars argue that police play a role in exacerbating these issues [Bitner, 
1967; Jacobs & Britt, 1979], the role of data in confronting police criticisms could help 
expand the issues police focus on and provide police with alternative ways of addressing 
issues. For example, instead of focusing on enforcing the law, through collaborations 
with social workers, police could be equipped to provide resources (e.g., food access, 
occupational trainings, or job opportunities) to meet community needs. Second, data can 
temper police judgement through demonstrating police biases. Data can either confirm or 
counter their biases, depending on how data collection and analysis occurs. For instance, 
data could be used to demonstrate police bias driven by preconceptions of poverty and/or 
race (i.e. the kinds of cars pulled over, the kinds of people targeted, and the kinds of 
leeway given to crime in higher social status communities). Third, quantitative data can 
support evidence-driven approaches towards community interventions. Because police 
agencies (like most public services) operate under significant resource constraints, 
proactive, community-building efforts, guided by big data, can address community needs, 
and improve access to resources (i.e. youth programs to provide positive role-models, 
educational meetings for immigrant communities, drug awareness campaigns, or social 
work resources).  
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5.4 Conclusion 
For the participants at MMPD, challenges of adopting data-driven strategies in 
policing are experienced as they negotiate the sociotechnical visions for their work, some 
of which were explicitly meant to confront social criticisms of policing. In this study, I 
have made the following contributions: identified three key challenges in adopting of 
data-driven policing; identified how data can support and constrain police work and 
accountability; provided design implications for data use in police accountability. 
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Chapter 6: Re-Orienting Data-Driven Mythologies 
6.1 Research Context 
When this research around data-driven policing began, as indicated in Chapter 5, 
the Obama administration had already introduced optional data-driven initiatives for the 
police to participate in for improving community relationships and accountability. 
However, by the time the second study began with a diverse group of stakeholders in 
policing, the U.S. has been under the Trump administration. Subsequently, the fate of the 
Obama-era data-driven policing programs remains unclear, since this information is now 
archived online8. This cultural and political context is important to understand and situate 
this research because of how this administration is influencing the conversations around 
political issues of racism, marginalization, police accountability, immigration, etc. 
President Trump and his administration have been stripping away civil liberties and 
protections across several departments of the government (police accountability, 
education, student loan protections, etc.) [Minhaj, 2019]. The political rhetoric, since the 
2016 election, has also demonstrated extreme polarization, with critics blaming the 
emboldened, discriminatory narratives that the President pushes, citing 17% rise in hate 
crimes within Trump’s first year of presidency [Rogers et. al. 2019]. Rogers notes that 
this polarization is not solely because of the president, but also other factors in society. 
For instance, social media platforms are also under fire for how their algorithms induce 
echo chambers, where people are exposed to opinions they agree with [Garimella et. al., 
2018], as opposed to accessing impartial news around important social issues.  
                                                 
8 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-police-data-initiative 
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Similarly, the concept of “fake news” (which emerges in my research often) has 
been adopted by President Trump to discredit often legitimate and critical information 
[Lazer et. al. 2018]. The “fake news” claims are intertwined with the epidemic of 
misinformation that is being spread through social media [Satariano, 2019]. However, on 
another hand, some consider the election of Donald Trump a turning point in perhaps 
spurring more citizens to participate in democracy (i.e., record setting turnout for 2018 
midterm elections) [Domonoske, 2018]. The levels of participation indicate that the 
existing and emerging political issues are important for constituents to influence with 
their votes. Beyond elections, there continues to be a wide space of grassroots activism 
that continues to do work around politically contentious topics like police brutality, with 
increasing attention being paid to how the rhetoric espoused by the President is impacting 
marginalized communities [Levin, 2018]. In order to understand the results that are 
presented in the next section, it is important to situate the research context politically and 
culturally here. 
6.2 Results 
In the following section, I have identified three ways that stakeholders perceive 
data use as an extension of police’s power in the quest for accountability. Who has power 
in society manifests in several ways, based on which groups of people get to influence 
access to and decisions around creating and legitimizing knowledge [Foucault, 1980]. My 
participants raised concerns around how they see power disparities impact police-
community relationships from varying perspectives and how data stands to perpetuate 
those disparities, while hindering police accountability. In what follows, I outline my 
participants’ concerns around police’s power manifesting in how knowledge is created 
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through data, how resources are supported through data, and finally, how police control 
communities through data.  
Data Use for Knowledge 
In this research, power disparities around data-driven police accountability 
primarily emerged around which groups of people get to create, legitimize, and use data 
as actionable knowledge and what those groups’ values, interests, and biases mean for the 
space for action in different communities. Here, knowledge is defined as representations 
through data that are legitimized as facts, information, and narratives around police 
accountability. While data’s politicized nature is widely acknowledged by academics, 
data-driven technologies and practices are marketed and adopted with the promises of 
establishing ground truth, supporting decision-making, and achieving accountability. 
However, in this research, it was evident that most stakeholders were aware that police’s 
data could not be unbiased, primarily because how political police accountability is in our 
society. Despite the level of trust the participants had in the police, almost all participants 
expressed mistrust in data’s ability to present the truth around a contentious topic like 
police accountability (at least in its current form, in the current political climate).  
Manifestation of Power in Data Use  
Organizers and community members, who were critical of the police, were quick 
to point out how the creation and use of data manifest power imbalances, such as not 
including (and legitimizing) marginalized communities’ experiences and reinforcing 
existing, systemic inequalities and biases. For example, an organizer here points out how 
data produced by the police, about the police, could not produce sufficient accountability 
between police and the communities:  
82 
Police accountability, with how things stand in our country, is impossible. 
Maybe forced accountability is an option? When one side has a gun 
pointed at the other, there is no chance of them ‘serving’ us. So it doesn’t 
really matter to me what data the police can show me because they’re 
making that shit up themselves, it’s not like they follow any standards set 
up by anyone. They are creating and showing us information about their 
own selves, holding their own selves accountable, how does that work? 
We don’t need to see more crime data and more rationalization for them 
policing black and brown bodies. That’s one sided… is [the data] really 
reflecting what black and brown communities are going through at the 
hands of these officers? [P8] 
While P8’s frustration is at large with the system of laws and policies that allow police to 
shape accountability practices, her comments around the role of data in trying to produce 
accountability sheds light on the facts that the data presented by the police is often 
obscure. The constraints around how the data is collected, curated, and presented are not 
clear in the first place. In my previous study, the police participants also indicated that 
data collection and creation is not an exact science and is often an arbitrary process 
district to district, marred with entry errors and legacy systems. The organizer also points 
out that this data is imbalanced in whose experience it depicts. Not only does this data 
use fail to represent the reality for POC communities, it also does not show the 
information around police actions in the communities to be able to hold the police 
accountable overall. Similarly, another organizer reflected on how police’s data use and 
policies are exclusive of the experiences of the people most impacted by the police: 
I am not here to understand policies that result in dead community 
members. I am here to rewrite policies that are inclusive, that listen to 
those who are the ones most affected and then take direction from them on 
how we proceed. If you continually have people at the table that do not 
have direct experience with the problem you are trying to fix then your 
solution will never be about solving problems. Your solution is about 
making yourself feel better. We have to get to a place where we are 
humble enough to understand that listening solves many more problems 
than deciding to do things TO people. [P15] 
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Without the input of marginalized groups, police’s data-driven accountability efforts 
remain dubious for several of the organizing participants. The spaces where decisions 
about what data to create, how to use it, and how to present it, are imbued with inherent 
power. Not only are police officers the ones in charge of the data creation and use, the 
data they are able to collect is inherently incomplete. As another organizer pointed out, 
community policing applications and forums stand to exacerbate how POC communities 
are policed:   
Something like NextDoor can be helpful but …when you have a 
NextDoor community that is mostly white people and an actual 
community that is mixed demographically - racially, economically, and 
everything else, but it's seen as a solution to the problem of undesirables 
and it's leveraged in a way that is based on fear of something happening 
versus something actually happening. So that’s all information going to 
the police and it is then used to disrupt actual communities because now 
white people have another [virtual] space to be scared of ‘others’. [P3] 
P3 indicates that the groups of people that trust and choose to engage with the police and 
report crime tips does not necessarily depict the on-the-ground make-up of a 
neighborhood community; this organizer raises concerns around how applications like 
NextDoor can exacerbate policing of minority communities. While the organizer 
indicates that the “fear” of “others” drives who gets policed and for whom, community 
data sources are limited in who the police can collect information from.  
Several of the participants indicated limited optimism that a technological 
solution could help mitigate the power inequalities between police and marginalized 
communities because of how they perceived technology (through both design and 
practice) to embody the underlying assumptions and biases of the groups with power. For 
the organizing and critical community participants, it was evident that if the data police 
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collect and use is to represent a more grounded truth, the power imbalances around which 
groups of people and communities get to influence data practices must be addressed.  
It is also important to note that some of my participants saw POC communities’ 
hesitation and refusal to engaging with MMPD as a symptom of data being transactional 
for accountability. The police participants expressed frustration with the lack of 
engagement they receive from the community when they organize trainings and events to 
inform and disseminate data to the community (“if we organize these academies and 
public safety trainings for a hundred people, and then we keep having only 20-30 people 
sign up year after year, then how much is that our fault? People are not invested in law 
enforcement. They don’t recognize it as their own.” [P9]). However, through 
observations, it was clear that attending informational events that the police organize, 
outside of community meetings, often meant filling out an application for a background 
check, which includes giving up personal information like Social Security Number, birth 
date, living history, work information, etc. A couple of my participants saw these events 
as transactional and limiting the inclusion of different groups of people, who would either 
not apply because of discomfort around not sharing that personal information or simply 
because they might not make the cut from the background check. While the police’s 
intention to share information with the community and be more transparent is evident in 
the events and information they do offer, this knowledge is still guarded and exchanged 
for information that might be uncomfortable for some people to transact with the police. 
Additionally, there was a stark difference in how the different stakeholders 
experienced access to police and information around the police in this research. 
Community participants who were part of local organizations like Crime Watch indicated 
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(boasted about) the level of access they have experienced with MMPD. For instance, one 
Crime Watch community member here shared an instance where he received complaints 
about a stray dog from his neighbors and how he was able to decide what to do in that 
situation (which happened to be to shoot the dog because he was “aggressive” and 
“barking”) because of his connections to the local police officers: 
with being involved like this with the community and [the police], I’ve 
made a lot of connections… When I had the problem with that free dog in 
our neighborhood… I called [a police officer] right there, and he picked 
up right away, completely helpful. He was like, if you need to put down 
that dog, you have to. If it’s a threat to the neighborhood, do what needs to 
be done. Came by afterwards to help wrap it up… [P7] 
While P7’s example of his access to the local police demonstrates the differences in 
experiences of different community members around police responsiveness, the local 
activists and more critical community participants indicated that access and utility of 
police’s data was inadequate. For example, here an organizer points out that information 
about police complaint board and merit board meetings, which are the main spaces for 
accountability between the police and community, was obscured and inaccessible:  
I mean, they make it so hard to even be in the same space where police 
accountability is supposed to exist. For example, the merit board review 
meetings, where officers who have killed black men in this city are 
supposed to be fired, are done at the most inconvenient times, in the 
middle of the week, middle of the day. Which, okay, that’s fine, but to 
even find out the schedule, you have to drive to downtown, pay for 
parking, go up to the top floor, go through this maze to a tiny, little 
bulletin board. Like its 2018. If you really wanted the public to be there 
and hold you accountable and engage, you really can’t think of other ways 
of sharing this information to us? [P2] 
Almost all community members, regardless for the extent of their support or disregard for 
the police, indicated that MMPD should work to make relevant information more easily 
accessible. The transaction of data and information manifests the underlying power police 
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hold in terms of how easily and openly data and what kinds of data is shared with which 
groups of people. 
Manifestation of Mistrust in Data Use 
Most of my participants experienced data creation and use as an extension of 
powers also through the mistrust around how data is inherently framed into narratives 
based on the embedded biases and interests of groups of people who have the power to 
legitimize the data. However, while community members and organizers expressed 
limited trust in police’s data use for rationalizing decision-making, the police on the other 
hand, also ascribed to significant doubt in the anti-police narratives and information they 
see online and in the media. For instance, this detective sees social media as an amplifier 
of police issues that he does not think are prevalent on the ground to the extent being 
portrayed: 
Social media’s anonymity doesn’t allow repercussions of what people say. 
Law enforcement has always had a healthy protest environment and 
counter culture. It’s always going to have that opposition, if they didn’t we 
wouldn’t be in business. Officers have to work on overcoming the 
opposition on an individual, case by case basis. And now this is 
susceptible to influence from outer countries, as we are seeing. Those 
things are also impacting trust and how people think of our accountability 
I think. But if we really look at the scale of our interactions and the 
negative ones in reality, it would blow people away. We can do that, look 
at all the interactions police have against the negative ones, like shootings, 
force, what have you, that data is available. Are there true cops that are not 
fit to be on streets? Yes, absolutely. Better supervision, yes. We are 
always going to be organizational problems, but people don’t know the 
scale. I don’t trust the data we see online or in the media. [P4]  
Here, the officer caveats his doubt in the public scrutiny around policing with the 
acknowledgement that there are inept police officers in the force, who abuse their power, 
but overall, he indicates that data could help them prove that police criticisms are not as 
widespread as social media and media might portray them to be.  
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Through these conversations with the various stakeholders, the limitation of trust 
in data emerged as being understandably interlinked with popular narratives around 
political bias in the information presented. For instance, almost all participants pointed 
towards the limitation of data use in supporting trust, producing unbiased accounts of 
truth, and ultimately, in influencing people’s viewpoints. One police supporter 
participant, when talking about moments where MMPD has been under scrutiny, revealed 
that information and data around police brutality are not always important to her in 
maintaining trust: 
…when [an officer] hit the motorcyclist and killed, he had been drinking, 
there were screams of a cover up and people demoted. I didn’t really 
question it, but that was a time I could have, I didn’t let my trust waiver in 
them. We have to protect our own, as a group… [The chief] tried to keep 
things from getting out of hand. Every time something is repeated, it is 
different. And sometimes that looks like cover-up. Does that make sense? 
People were screaming for all the details, it was like a lynch mob. My 
reality is my perception, that’s just the way it is. [P6] 
Here, the participant chose not the “let [her] trust waiver” in the police when there was an 
incident around police accountability, despite the information that was and was not made 
available. Similarly, this sentiment was also echoed when another participant expressed 
how police accountability was a political issue and trust in information and data 
presented was influenced by political biases: 
I quit getting newspapers because it’s too left wing. Of course, we get 
some data from the police, but a lot of data is reported by the media, right? 
Most of that is opinion. First time in American history that fake news has 
become a common household word. If I didn’t see it or hear it, I don’t 
believe it. [P7] 
Around a topic that is so deeply politically and historically contentious, almost all of the 
participants indicated mistrust in the information and data that is available in the 
mainstream media platforms. On the other end of the political spectrum, most of the 
88 
organizing participants also did not believe that accountability through data-driven 
policing was possible. One participant here talks about how bias against the police is 
important in her work as an activist around police: 
I am never going to apologize for giving a black person who says they’ve 
been brutalized the benefit of the doubt. I would much rather be wrong 
about that than dismissing someone who says they’ve experienced 
violence... Because also, I’m not going to be sorry for ever doubting the 
police. Being skeptical of them cause I know police and nothing can 
change those things. That’s a bias, but you can bet it is earned. [P13] 
For P13, information around police brutality is not as credible as a person’s experience, 
which is why she expressed how her mistrust of the police guides her work and 
relationships around police accountability. This raises questions around whose data and 
experiences are captured and legitimized ultimately in police data, which is important 
because as systemic biases have been recognized and critiqued, expecting trust in data 
from the same system becomes unrealistic for these stakeholders. Moreover, critical 
participants emphasized that data can be another way for police to frame narratives 
around societal issues and POC communities. For instance, here a community member 
expressed her frustration around how the data around policing and from police carried 
racial biases: 
Drug support is different for white people, while black people are arrested. 
If you are certain color, you are perpetuating the problem, if you are white, 
you are the victim of the problem. [That’s what is] morally unsound where 
not everyone is being viewed the same, as a noble, valuable being. It is 
how we are educated, it’s our media, the way things are presented, 
whatever you wanna say. [P10] 
This community member’s critique of how police use data sheds light on how 
stakeholders’ concerns emerge around data shaping the spaces for police actions: where 
certain communities are criminalized for social issues, others receive empathetic support 
and resources. While it was clear that almost all participants carried varying levels of 
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distrust in data sources around policing, several of the participants indicated that more 
comprehensive data focused on police’s activities and their interactions could possibly 
counteract how data is framed into narratives.  
They’re always going to heavily police our communities, they’ll give you 
this data and that data, but we don’t get data about the police and what 
they do. The FBI has reports about crime data that police collect for them, 
but not any standards that force police to tell us how many use of force 
cases they were involved in, how many unarmed shootings, how many 
cops have a history of abuse. We are just starting to get those information 
from other activists and organizations, websites where regular folks, 
citizens, are doing the work to hold police accountable with data that can 
actually paint that picture [of police actions]. [P15] 
If data is to support police accountability, stakeholders expressed wanting to see police 
present data on their own activities, as opposed to just crime data. As evident by these 
empirical results, stakeholders’ concerns were around how data can be an extension of 
police’s power in what societal issues are criminalized, which communities are policed, 
what narratives are legitimized, and how they rationalize police’s actions.  
Data Use for Resources 
While several participants were critical of how data use shapes narratives and 
information around the police, police’s data use also raised concerns around how 
decisions around resources are rationalized and allocated within policing organizations. 
Resources here refer to expertise, technology, materials, information sources, funding, 
and other assets to support a police organization’s work and practices; resources also 
include the services the police provide to the community.  
For most of the participants (community, organizers, and police), there was a 
succinct awareness that it is impossible for the police to collect all data around the city’s 
police and crime issues. Whether the participants attributed this to the fact that not all 
crimes are reported by community members or that police do not patrol all communities 
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with the same suspicion and leniency, several participants saw technology and data use as 
likely exacerbating existing biases and even leading to over policing of POC 
communities. For example, P3 further commented about applications like NextDoor that 
can present a skewed reality based on which groups of people participate in those spaces 
and create data for the police to utilize:  
… the thing that is still coming to the light like with activists working in 
Chicago and New York and we are trying to understand is how these 
datasets, tips and community reports, and police data are used to put police 
officers where they patrol, how the brass use data to justify the 
surveillance and policing of marginalized [communities]… [P3] 
Here, this organizer echoed other critical participants about the obscurity around data-
driven decision making within police and how technology and data influence the 
interactions between police and different communities. If certain communities are not 
consciously included in social and technical platforms, that data source can stand to 
perpetuate the existing power disparities between police and POC communities. For 
instance, several community participants from crime watch groups bragged about their 
access to the police when they have had a concern or an incident occur. As demonstrated 
above, P7 shared an example of a neighborhood disturbance and how his access to the 
police enabled him to get help faster than he knows a regular citizen would:  
it’s not about who you know, but who knows you. That’s what gets [an 
officer] to text you back immediately, or get all those potholes fixed. [P7] 
Inversely, several other community and activists were dubious about police’s response 
rates to different communities. Here, a community member talked about her experiences 
around police responsiveness after moving from a predominantly minority neighborhood 
only a couple of miles away: 
Yeah, and the police respond very quickly here. So we have a young man 
who used to live in our former neighborhood, it’s a 10 minute walk away, 
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but when we moved to this mostly white neighborhood, we were surprised 
about how the police and emergency services respond in like 3 minutes 
here, but back there, whenever there was an emergency where we used to 
live, it could take the police or even the fire department a really long 
[time] to get there. So if like something goes wrong, you know that the 
police are going to be there, the fire fighters are going to be there, and that 
was coming from like a young refugee boy who has lived both in both 
these neighborhoods just a short distance apart. [P5] 
Several other participants also echoed the same doubts around what factors influence how 
responsive the police is to some communities compared to others in the city. Concerns 
around how the police relate and respond to different communities were also intertwined 
with concerns around how data can stand to make access to police better and worse for 
different communities:  
…if only richer folks, white neighborhoods or people are tipping the 
police, posting and creating these leads for the police, all this community-
generated data that the police always push for, it is just an extension of the 
surveillance of police on marginalized communities. So we don’t ever 
really see our communities’ voices and concerns in the information police 
have and work with. Could we? I don’t know, I really don’t think so, not 
through [the police]. [P8] 
If data use shapes the space for actions, legitimizing needs, then it is important to address 
whose needs are vocalized through data and whose are excluded when only certain 
communities choose and/or are able to engage in police accountability spaces and 
practices in sociotechnical ways. For these participants, data use simply cycles through 
the same power disparities and racial biases that already exist in how different 
communities are surveilled and served. 
A few stakeholders also expressed wanting accountability around the resources 
and funding police receive as well as the role data plays in acquiring those resources. 
These concerns, mainly from organizers and community members, revolved around the 
92 
increasing militarization and surveillance state of the police. For instance, another activist 
discussed what MMPD’s investment in a data center means for the community:  
I think there are bigger things that we don’t talk about in terms of where 
policing is headed, right? Yeah, they have this data center now and it is 
promoted as you know, making us all safer now as a city, but we know 
they are using that data to justify asking for more weaponry, more 
militarization as well, that’s happening all over the country. If we, the 
people the police are supposed to be serving, don’t trust and cannot even 
really see this information in the first place, how is it okay for them to use 
it to get funding? [P15] 
This participant points out that while data use can support rationalization of police needs 
and agendas, being data-driven can be to the detriment of the marginalized communities, 
especially considering that the data police produce is not guided by consistent federal or 
state standards still. Without standardized data collection practices and procedures, 
another participant was doubtful that such funding requests truly depicted community 
needs. On the other hand, during my observations with police officers, a few of them did 
view data as increasingly more essential in “proving [their] case” [P4] for investments 
from governmental funding agencies. This was especially important to them because of 
the manpower and technological expertise constraints they operate under. However, one 
officer, during a ride-along, also expressed confidence in being able to acquire funding 
more easily for weaponry and technology under the Trump administration. Ultimately, 
for several of these stakeholders, data use supports and manifests political agendas that 
are already in place within police accountability issues, instead of a way to truly depict 
community needs and provide rigorous accountability around police actions.  
Several other participants, including a couple of police officers, expressed hope for 
police’s data use to identify and legitimize underpinning societal issues related to crime, 
such as mental illness, poverty, drug abuse, etc. While community and organizer 
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participants shared this view, one police officer in particular defensively voiced his 
frustration with the larger political infrastructure that does not provide the necessary 
services for at-risk community members, placing additional burden on police agencies:  
…it is not our fault that from the top, legislation, public services and 
funding for mental illness related issues and, you know, public safety 
institutions, gun control, you name it, has been gutted over the past 
decades. So now there are calls for us to be trained in this and that, but 
there are no laws mandating those trainings as a profession, the 
expectations are not shared between the police and the community. So yes, 
I believe we [the police] have always been held accountable. Does that 
mean it’s to the same level that some people expect? No, probably not, 
that’s not going to happen unless actual legislation comes in, so all the 
public and media can yell at us, sure... [P9] 
None of the police participants acknowledged that police accountability in MMPD had 
failed. The hedge in P9’s statement is that they have been accountable according to the 
standards and laws that are set, but he also knows that the level of accountability 
mandated through legislation is not always up to the communities’ expectations. From 
the police perspective, accountability is often about how our federal and state laws do and 
do not operationalize police behavior and training. 
If police services are a resource to protect and serve communities, several of the 
participants indicated doubt around how policing resources are supported within the 
larger political system. For instance, one community member, who did not think that the 
police are held sufficiently accountable, did point out that police are not functioning in a 
“morally sound” political system:  
…[we have] laws that are criminalizing poverty, drug abuse… overall, our 
government, society do not provide a morally sound framework for [how 
police] can serve communities and how police could even be used to uplift 
struggling communities. [P5]  
Resources in this context revolve around both the support and services that police 
agencies receive as well as the communities that are served by the police. My 
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stakeholders expressed concerns around how data use impacts the disproportionate 
amount of resources police stand to receive that could further marginalize POC 
communities, as well as how police are often held responsible for lack of resources to 
address underpinning issues that lead to crime.  
Data Use for Control 
From the first two empirical sections, it is clear that stakeholders are concerned 
around how data is transformed into knowledge and how that knowledge then is used to 
rationalize police’s decision-making. Subsequently, these concerns, particularly from 
organizers and POC community members, settled around how police use their power to 
profile and surveil marginalized communities, and the role data plays in supporting those 
spaces of police action. While access to resources is intertwined with police’s capacity to 
control communities, control here refers to the discretion and responsibility police have 
to maintain social order, through force if necessary. While data can impact what 
narratives are legitimized and what resources police function with, for my stakeholders, 
data also stands to play a role in the interactions police have with community members, 
particularly POC. For example, almost all of the organizer participants and POC 
community participants shared examples of times they had experienced profiling; here an 
activist shared an incident where she filed a complaint against police officers over being 
pulled over as a suspect, even though her vehicle’s description did not match the 
information the police had: 
I have a couple of police misconduct complaints going on with [MMPD]. 
Like one when they pulled me over at McDonalds and those officers knew 
me, but were looking for a suspect, they had information on their 
description and car. Of course, turns out the description of the car was so 
far off, totally different color and make but they all know me over at 
MMPD. They will always say that we are just investigating, doing our job, 
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but why would you pull over a completely different car and act like it 
matches your description when it doesn’t? I know they have all kinds of 
information on me. So that was just an excuse for them to come harass me 
as they do... [P15] 
Here the organizer speculates that she was targeted in this instance because of her 
contentious relationship with the local police, where the police misused the suspect 
information they had to pull her over, which then became the basis of her complaint 
against them. Similarly, another activist shared her experience of being targeted and 
intimidated by the police:  
Like I said before, there have been several times that I have been targeted 
by the police, and it really makes you wonder what data they have on you 
and how it all flows between them. One time, the FBI came to my parent’s 
house, looking for me. I don’t live there and hadn’t for years. Another 
time, that same year, the local police pulled me over and he greeted me 
with my name. It’s like we know your name, we know about you, we are 
watching you… [P8] 
While racial profiling and intimidation are prevalent in the experiences of POC and 
activist communities, for most of these participants, they saw data as another way of 
giving the police tools and opportunities to target marginalized communities. Similarly, 
all of the POC community participants shared several examples of precautions they take 
in interacting with the police, as well as examples of interactions that might have been 
motivated by officers’ racial bias. For these participants, the role of data was questioned 
in how surveillance and profiling is justified and motivated around different community 
members: 
I think I worry for my brothers, as black men, in this society a lot more 
than I do for myself. I mean, my younger brother didn’t tell me until years 
after about how much he used to get pulled over by the police when he 
was in high school, when he first started driving and like for nothing, 
cause we didn’t even know at home, right? But that’s all data that I think 
could be so helpful. Right now, it seems like the police are using data to 
justify their racist patrolling and policing practices, but when do we get to 
see that overall data, that these officers always pull over this many 
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minorities and white people and how much does it actually end up in some 
kind of charge or unarmed shootings? What are the races of those officers? 
Racism is a problem in this country with the police, and those in power 
ignore this in everything they do. [P5] 
This community member expressed that while she worries data is being used to 
perpetuate racial bias within policing, she would much rather see data used to paint an 
aggregate understanding of how race plays in a role in police-community interactions. 
Several of my participants indicated that unless the issues around racism are better 
understood and legitimized, police stand to continue racial bias through their data-driven 
policing.  
Inversely, while none of the police participants indicated that police 
accountability had ever failed within MMPD in their experience, one officer did 
acknowledge the inherent power that comes with being a part of a policing organization. 
…what it really boils down to is that the community has no choice but to 
trust the police. Everyone calls us, and the ones who are the loudest 
against us are the ones, funnily enough, calling us even more… look at 
that data, right? Even if they hate us, everyone still calls us for everything. 
Most of the times for things we can’t do much about anyway. [P12] 
Here, P12 acknowledges that communities do not often have another option or avenue for 
resolving issues, despite how they might feel about the police or how much the police 
could help them ultimately. Similarly, another officer expressed doubt around the 
legitimacy of activist organizations as he raised concerns around who funds BLM 
activists: 
There has always been a healthy counter culture against policing. BLM 
isn’t new, but what we see as officers is that these issues are politicized 
right? So you have to look at the funding these activists get to disrupt the 
communities, Soros for example. That’s part of what we do on social 
media when we monitor and observe certain groups. Have there been 
injustices to them? I’m sure. But these protests and things are part of 
larger agendas. [P4]  
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Here the officer indicates that police use social media data to monitor local activist 
organizations because of how he thinks such organizations can be used to advance anti-
police sentiments in society. Police represent an infrastructure of dealing with conflicts 
and safety-related issues, which is both about police’s responsibility and power in the 
community. Data’s role in maintaining and exacerbating these power disparities stands to 
be problematic.  
6.3 Conclusion 
In this section, I have identified three ways that my stakeholders experience data 
use as an extension of police’s power, as well as outlined how those stakeholder 
perceptions hinder police accountability. The legitimacy of data produced by the police is 
often dubious for several of my participants because they see data-driven police 
accountability as biased and exclusionary as the criminal justice system it is situated in. 
Similarly, trust in police’s data is also impacted by the larger cultural phenomenon of 
misinformation.  
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Chapter 7: Design Implications 
This case study of data politics in human-services highlights larger societal issues 
of power, unequal citizenship, systemic biases, and governmental accountability. My 
dissertation contributes at the intersection of data use, accountability, and power 
disparities. This research demonstrates several challenges and limitations of data-driven 
technology and practices, such as how values associated with a “culture of data” lack 
social and human context; epistemological biases towards certain forms of data; frictions 
between data and domain expertise; political mistrust of representations of reality; and 
how data use often perpetuates power disparities and systemic inequalities. Subsequently, 
I aim to reorient the data mythologies that I have identified through this work to mitigate 
the power disparities that hinder data-driven accountability. Because data’s embedded 
values and biases are inevitable, I present design guidelines around how data-driven 
values of objectivity, trust, and transparency can be reoriented through pragmatic HCI 
guidelines to support more robust accountability. However, before I dive into the design 
recommendations, in what follows, I present arguments regarding the political and 
ideological context underpinning the work around police accountability and how these 
contexts are intertwined with my design guidelines around data use.  
The key stakeholders in this research adopt sometimes incompatible approaches 
(abolition vs. reform) around the issues of police brutality and accountability. 
Abolitionists fundamentally question the legitimacy of police organizations, advocating 
for alternative ways for public safety and conflict resolution than the current criminal 
justice system [Purnell, 2017]. Police abolitionists’ rhetoric is rooted in the history and 
identity of unequal citizenship, which refers to minority groups who have not been given 
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equal voice for democratic participation [Collins, 2012]. On the other hand, reformists 
are working, to varying degrees, within the criminal justice system to make incremental 
changes to how police and courts disproportionately impact marginalized communities. 
In other words, reformists focus on how to cultivate pathways to equal citizenship within 
the system [Meyerson, 2004]. Both approaches, while in several ways can be 
irreconcilable (i.e., my abolitionist participants refused to engage at all with the police for 
demanding change, but rather invested their time and efforts into creating new ways of 
community organization), hinge on the shared mistrust towards the police. With this 
research, I argue that both these approaches are necessary and intertwined in achieving a 
more equitable futures around policing and marginalized communities. Subsequently, my 
dissertation advocates for how HCI can support both approaches through being data-
driven.  
In this research, while activist and police approaches and attitudes towards public 
safety are different, ultimately, they do share the goal of community safety and equality. 
This means that there are overlaps in how technology and data use can help achieve 
accountability around the issues of crime and misuse of power. While politics and 
systemic inequalities are responsible for creating social issues, such as police 
accountability, I content that technology use can and must play an important role in 
dismantling existing biases and inequalities instead of exacerbating and perpetuating 
them. The biases and agendas embedded in technology need to be evaluated and 
mitigated as data-driven technology and practices become more prevalent in our society. 
In this discussion section, I unpack more concretely how technology and data use can 
better support police accountability. 
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7.1 Designing for Strong Objectivity 
Research around data use questions its objectivity and relativism—what are valid 
ways of creating and legitimizing different kinds of knowledge? As Sandra Harding 
points out, to choose between objectivity and relativism is inherently limiting to our 
ability to understand “nature and social relations” [Harding, 1995 p. 332]. She positions 
the concept of “strong objectivity” against scientific objectivity, which has often been 
portrayed as neutral. However, scientific objectivity is a widely contested concept. First, 
objectivity has been, historically, attributed to certain groups of people, whereas other 
groups have been characterized as less capable of making impartial and objective 
judgements [Harding, 1995]. Second, objectivity relates to how methods of knowing are 
considered “fair” or more objective in producing knowledge claims (e.g., quantitative vs. 
qualitative methods). Finally, scientific objectivity is contested because of how certain 
groups of experts include and exclude “members of different classes, races and/or 
genders” [Harding, 1995 p. 333]. Similarly, Proctor (1991) characterizes neutrality, 
which is a requirement of objectivity, as a “myth, mask, shield and sword” because of 
how it can shape problem spaces for action. Feminist and post-colonial scholars have 
demonstrated that the concepts of objectivity and neutrality are fundamentally flawed and 
thus lead to narrow and limited ways of knowing about the world, which are often 
imbued with values and interests of the powerful groups. As Harding notes: 
Objectivism defends and legitimates the institutions and practices through 
which the distortions and their often exploitative consequences are 
generated. It certifies as value-neutral, normal, natural, and therefore not 
political at all the policies and practices through which powerful groups 
can gain the information and explanations that they need to advance their 
priorities. [Harding, 1995 p. 337] 
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Instead, strong objectivity, which here is defined as being inclusive of other perspectives, 
strengthens standards of objectivity. She claims that in order to “modernize the notion of 
objectivity,” we must strive to “maximize objectivity.” While we cannot achieve absolute 
objectivity, we can adopt practices that view objectivity on a spectrum from weak to 
strong.  Strong objectivity entails including perspectives from multiple vantage points, 
different groups of people for more robust knowledge creation. In this dissertation, I 
apply the concept of strong objectivity to the rhetoric and limitations around data use and 
how this viewpoint can help us mitigate data’s false claims of neutrality. Similarly, the 
concept of strong objectivity also informed the research design for the last study in terms 
of collecting data from multiple groups of stakeholders.  
As data-driven technology and practices becomes more normalized and popular in 
society, it raises questions like how and what knowledge is created? Who gets to create 
said knowledge? Which data are legitimized? Whose experiences, interests, and biases 
are embodied in the data? What underpinning values and societal inequalities do data use 
carry?  
In what follows, I outline three main ways that strong objectivity can inform HCI 
at the intersection of practice, design and policy around data use: participation from key 
stakeholders (practice), legitimization of metis and non-traditional forms of data (design), 
and regulation of data creation and use policies (policy).  
Participation of Key Stakeholders 
My results suggest that as claims of objectivity and truth are integrated into data-
driven organizational cultures, HCI scholars and designers must address limitations 
around data use and mitigate power disparities (i.e., financial, educational, legal, safety, 
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etc.) that emerge on-the-ground. This is especially important because organizations with 
power, like the police, are using data to establish ground truth, which then stands to shape 
the kinds of support and treatment communities receive. Ultimately, this research raises 
concerns around how one group of people can investigate and hold themselves truly 
accountable, as well as how like-minded groups of people can reveal their own biases 
that manifest in data. As evidenced by this research, and the current cultural climate, 
which is characterized with significant political polarization (as pointed out in Chapter 6), 
people from various communities feel strongly about police accountability across the 
political spectrum. It is clear that just as police are heavily scrutinized, so too is the data 
validity that is produced by the police. 
In this section, I address how community participation from key stakeholders can 
help maximize objectivity in the police’s use of data and potentially address some data 
limitations in achieving police accountability in their data use. Based on how data is 
shaped and decontextualized, data makes certain parts of police work invisible, including 
work practices and stakeholders (beneficiaries and marginalized communities). The 
practices that are not easily quantified and digitized are relevant to account for in 
understanding how police shape data and impact communities. My results indicate that 
polices’ data use alone is not sufficient to support police action and judgment because 
such quantitative data produced by the police provides rationalities for action that hinders 
their ability to understand marginalized communities’ criticisms of the police and thus, 
hampers efforts towards accountability.  
Consequently, my research shows that solutions for combating issues of data 
politics in police accountability cannot be effective without deeper community 
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engagement from key stakeholders. Previous work in HCI has highlighted the role of 
technology in community practices around crime [Blom et. al., 2010; Erete, 2013]. For 
instance, Erete’s work indicates that while technology can help increase social capital and 
efficacy in neighborhoods, technology is better suited to supplement community 
meetings around crime, rather than replace them as citizens participate in local, civic 
engagement initiatives [Erete, 2015]. Community informatics research has demonstrated 
that technology by itself may not increase communities’ political power, but does provide 
mechanisms for governmental accountability as well as options for citizens to participate 
in local decision-making [Erete, 2013; Erete & Burrell, 2017]. 
In order to assist police in becoming more accountable, I recommend that all 
phases of data work be community-driven. Data work here refers to the planning, 
creation, analysis, and presentation of data as knowledge with a larger committee of key 
stakeholders. Such community-driven data practices could enable a more transparent way 
to account for police practices as well as determine how police actions are reflected in the 
data. This kind of collaboration would pull in stakeholders, including community 
members, critics, activists, and data experts, from civilian society to be part of data 
planning (i.e. data collection, analysis, and implementation). Currently, the community is 
presented with data as a final product of police work. However, if police want data to 
legitimize their work, data cannot be created and presented to the community as an end 
product, but rather should be shaped in collaboration with the community, particularly 
being inclusive of voices that are marginalized by and critical of the police. This 
collaborative effort could then aim to explore and implement ways that we, as a society, 
understand the underpinning issues of crime, recidivism, and systemic racism. Moreover, 
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this does not mean that this committee of key stakeholders has to be open to the public 
since the police have to be careful of what kinds of information and decisions they can 
reveal. However, having a more independent committee of experts, activists, police, and 
community members could help regulate and evaluate the use of data, grounded in the 
context of the city.  
However, challenges exist in involving stakeholders from minority and 
marginalized communities in the co-creation of police data. These include, among other 
things, whether the police is willingness to cooperate with these communities. 
Subsequently, such an initiative raises issues of power in this context. Indeed, depending 
on who is permitted to be involved, the data created could continue to carry certain 
agendas or reproduce inequalities, as it may not adequately reflect the realities of those 
individuals and communities who are subject to its use. Another possible criticism of this 
type of community-engagement panel, as described earlier in this dissertation, could be 
the self-selection of wealthier and well-off community members, who are looking to gain 
political ground locally. Likewise, data literacy is an issue that could constrain 
community members from participating as well.  
While the components of participation from key stakeholders requires further 
defining, my research suggests that it could provide a constructive way forward, 
particularly if it embodies domain expertise and community metis. Such a panel could 
help the police identify potential solutions to the challenges they are grappling with in 
being data-driven. Initial design exploration with the police indicated that they would be 
open to such a collaboration, particularly if they could receive technical support and 
expertise that they often lack at an organizational level. Similarly, the case for strong 
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objectivity through community engagement was also made by organizers, who indicated 
the importance of listening and including the voices of those “who are the most 
affected… to take direction from them on how we proceed” [P15].  
Here, it is also important to note that simply having community participation is 
not sufficient. In order to maximize objectivity, differing experiences and perspectives 
are necessary to create more accurate accounts of police and community activity. As 
Harding states, “weak objectivity cannot identify paradigms.” Knowledge created by a 
powerful group cannot possibly identify patterns of discrimination and bias in their 
practices, as experienced by marginalized groups of people. If the police and 
communities are to truly uncover the patterns of mistrust and inappropriate behavior, data 
must be shaped in such a way that includes the perspectives and knowledge of all 
stakeholders, particularly the ones most negatively impacted by police work. 
Legitimizing Metis and Alternate Forms of Data 
Strong objectivity provides a way to view the problem space around data-driven 
technologies and practices devaluing metis, expertise, and non-traditional forms of data 
(unstructured, qualitative information) in the decision-making processes of human-
services workers. Because such organizations often serve at-risk individuals, researchers 
have argued that it is imperative to account for the human, social element of mission-
driven organizations, particularly since such organizations invest in people rather than 
profit [Kong, 2008]. Such work requires skills and expertise that is often invisible and not 
suitable for being captured digitally. My research illustrates the friction between the 
different types of expertise required to be data-driven in specific contexts. For instance, 
while the police are not data experts, data analysts are often not experts in policing. This 
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creates a tension in how data use supports policing on-the-ground and how policing 
practices support data use. This mismatch between data use and domain literacy raises 
concerns around faulty judgments and inactionability on-the-ground.  
Metis, or experiential knowledge, shapes how police make decisions and interact 
in unpredictable and difficult situations, and is unlikely to be entirely quantifiable. To 
deal with the bias towards quantitative data for supporting rationality, designs could 
legitimize qualitative data in the design of data-driven technologies. Specifically, designs 
incorporating more qualitative data forms (e.g., police narratives from incident reports, 
video footage from CCTV and social media, or community members’ accounts through 
written or audio recorded statements) can help police officers reflect on how they 
produce data and how that data supports decision-making. For example, my empirical 
work also suggests value in linking aggregate views of quantitative data to finer-
granularity, unstructured case notes. More specifically, designs supporting the collection, 
exploration, and visualization of both qualitative and quantitative data could foster a 
certain level of integration of metis, or at least consideration of, in data-driven tools and 
practices. Further, for accountability purposes, police actions cannot be captured in their 
entirety through just police collected and interpreted data. Thus, I recommend the 
community be directly involved by providing official methods for documenting their 
perspectives. Currently, some systems already exist that document police-citizen 
interactions (e.g., www.copwatch.org); however, they are not officially referenced by 
police during investigations. Thus, there is a need to officially capture citizen 
perspectives where the power of shaping narratives does not lie just with policing 
agencies.  
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I argue that without considering either police metis or communities’ lived 
experiences, data-driven accountability efforts will likely remain insufficient, or worse, 
provide a false sense of security in terms of what the data does and does not reflect about 
police actions. Being data-driven, in its current form, will also have an impact on how 
well data supports effective decision-making. I contend that legitimizing data sources that 
emerge from outside the police jurisdiction, non-traditional data types, as well as the 
metis of both police and communities, is an important way to support strong objectivity 
in the design of data-driven technologies. 
Regulating Policies around Data Collection & Use 
While I believe the above guidelines can provide a constructive way forward, 
these solutions fall short of systemically addressing the problem of often ad-hoc data use 
by police organizations. I argue that another way to maximize objectivity around police 
accountability is to regulate data creation and use through policy.  As of now, data use 
within MMPD is not standardized across districts. While police departments in America 
have been reporting Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)9 data to the FBI for decades, there 
are no standards or regulations around data-driven policing for accountability. What is 
more striking is that UCR does not provide guidelines or frameworks to collect data 
beyond crime and around police actions. This is problematic because police agencies, 
which are already often strapped for resources and expertise, are trying to keep up with 
the data-driven cultures around accountability, but without the adequate support or 
guidelines to do it well. Data practices need standardization through legislation. Unless 
data collection and use is standardized and regulated at the local, state, and federal levels, 
                                                 
9 https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr 
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comparability and actionability will continue to be hindered. In order to support the 
principles of democratic participation and governmental oversight, it is important for us, 
as community members, to understand how police’s impact is experienced throughout the 
nation to develop a better picture of the experiences on-the-ground. Regulation of data 
use can then also provide avenues for evaluating the police’s use of data and on-the-
ground practices. Through streamlining the kinds of data that are collected and how it is 
collected, we stand to create a more inclusive and authentic space for action around 
police accountability.  
Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to strong objectivity by exploring how 
accountability and democratic participation can be strengthened in power-disparate 
situations by providing sociotechnical solutions to mitigate issues around who is believed 
more and what kinds of data are believed more. First, this dissertation addresses concerns 
around who is believed more, particularly when looking at organizational power and 
marginalized communities. This empirical research reemphasizes how such power 
dynamics lead to marginalized experiences not being legitimized. Because activist groups 
are already conducting the work to increase capacity to legitimize marginalized accounts, 
contentious spaces can confront and mitigate the unequal citizenship that often exists in 
society by creating a framework for stakeholder participation. Similarly, developing 
policies and regulations around data usage can provide a foundation for governmental 
organizations to depict the problem spaces more accurately and consistently on aggregate 
levels. By applying the concept of strong objectivity to data-driven policing, this research 
contributes different ways of how strong objectivity can mitigate the power imbalances in 
knowledge creation and legitimization.  
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Secondly, this dissertation offers design interventions to mitigate the 
epistemological limitations of data use in terms of what kinds of data are believed more. 
Because data-driven technologies and practices are biased towards certain types of 
information, strong objectivity can also be applied to how different types of information 
sources support human-centered decision making. My dissertation expands on the 
concept of strong objectivity in technological contexts to help mitigate these 
epistemological biases around quantitative data in data-driven cultures. I contend that 
strong objectivity provides us ways to conceptualize and design for qualitative forms of 
data and metis to strengthen decision support which data-driven technologies are meant 
to provide. 
While these design implications focus on police accountability specifically, this 
empirical work can be applied as “strong concepts” to other design spaces as 
intermediate-level of knowledge [Hook & Lowgren, 2012]. Strong concepts refer to 
design knowledge that is generative and carries a core design idea that cuts across 
domains. Subsequently, applying these tenets of strong objectivity in data use would be 
helpful for domains, where accountability is an important and contentious topic as well as 
organizations that work with a human-centered mission. 
7.2 Designing for Information Transparency 
While strong objectivity allows us to explore sociotechnical solutions to help 
mitigate some of the power disparities around data-driven technologies and practices, 
there is still the question of what realities data can inherently demonstrate, particularly 
around sociopolitical issues. No data are truly “raw”; the identification and decisions of 
what data are to be measured and how data are categorized are political acts, motivated 
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implicitly or explicitly by different values [Crawford, 2013; Ribes & Jackson, 2013; 
Manovich, 2011]. Values and biases are embodied through the design of systems and 
practices as police produce and use data [LeDantec et. al., 2009; Voida et. al., 2014; 
Friedman et. al., 2006; Swenson, 2014]. Here, I define data bias as the influence users 
and technology have on how data are collected, cleaned, analyzed, presented, and used in 
decision-making. For example, data bias in the police context can include (1) categories 
and information that are and are not included in data collection tools, (2) narratives and 
agendas that are supported by data use and those which are not, (3) biased historical data 
perpetuating inequities in decision-making tools, and (4) inaccurate and incomplete data 
leading to erroneous insights.  
My research emphasizes the importance of understanding how data can and 
cannot support police work and accountability. As e-science literature also indicates, lack 
of contextual information around how, where, and by whom data is created leads to 
issues in data use and credibility [Faniel et. al., 2013; Faniel & Jacobsen, 2010; 
Zimmerman, 2007; Rolland & Lee, 2013]. Data provenance and data lineage are key 
concepts that have been explored in multiple research contexts to understand the origins 
of data, what happens to data, and where and how data moves over time. The goal here is 
to create visibility and transparency into the data pipeline for tracing back errors in data 
analytics. My discussion builds on this concept because more visible data lineage can 
also be a social mechanism for accountability in how data is produced, by whom, and for 
whom when dealing with a power disparate context. Subsequently, I contend that in order 
to address accountability issues around how data are produced and narratives framed, we 
must design for information transparency in the data production lifecycle (i.e., data 
111 
collection, analysis and reporting). Here, I use Turilli and Floridi’s definition of 
information transparency as not an ethical principle in itself, but as a “condition for 
enabling or impairing other ethical practices of principles” [Turilli & Floridi, 2009]. Data 
transparency becomes a pre-existing condition for police accountability by first 
establishing how data are produced and turned into information for decision-making. In 
other words, as data are used to hold police accountable, information transparency can be 
used as a principle to hold data use accountable. Unless the data production lifecycle 
becomes accessible to and legible by community members, accountability efforts stand to 
remain insufficient and haphazard. Indeed, accountability cannot stem from 
collaborations where the power to frame narratives through data remains with the police 
and the practices that produce such data are obscured or black boxed. 
The concept of information transparency could be applied more concretely 
throughout the phases of data use, including data planning, collection, analysis, and 
presentation. For instance, to demonstrate more transparency about how data use has 
been planned, police could provide information regarding which groups of people 
designed the data policies or cite references. Additionally, transparency around data 
collection could pinpoint who the data collectors are, at what point the data was input into 
the police systems, and what the data collection forms entail (explicit categories vs. self-
reporting fields). Similarly, for data analysis and presentation, information about the 
selected constraints (time range, types of crimes, status of reported crimes, etc.) could 
help consumers of data reflect upon how the constraints of the data could influence the 
spaces for action being shaped within policing.  
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The negative impacts around data bias were particularly brought to the forefront 
in conversations with my participants regarding politically contentious issues of police 
brutality and accountability. My research indicated that most of the participants do not 
consider that police’s data use can be unbiased in its current form. Consequently, the 
mistrust that communities feel towards the police bleeds into the data that are produced 
by the police.  
Similarly, organizations beyond policing are also contending with bias in being 
data-driven, particularly where data shapes decision-making and spaces for action. 
Information transparency as a strong concept should be integrated into design practices 
around data in other contexts. Information transparency will not solve the problem of 
biases in data but can provide for ways for both data providers and consumers to be more 
conscientious about the factors that shape the narratives supported by data-driven 
decision-making. 
7.3 Designing for Mistrust  
When speaking about police accountability, the concept of trust came up 
repeatedly with the stakeholders in my study. While some participants expressed 
unwavering trust towards the police, most of my participants spoke of police 
accountability in reference to the absence of trust in police organizations. This issue 
regarding trusting was not just limited to the contentious relationship police have with 
communities. Rather, mistrust was referenced as part of a wider cultural phenomenon of 
“fake news” as well as data violations from large social media companies, which has 
further eroded the public’s trust in democratic institutions and businesses in the United 
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States [Lazer et. al., 2018; Satariano, 2019]. The empirical evidence presented in this 
dissertation also raises questions about what it means to rescue data from “fake news”.  
As academics, who are hyper-aware that bias in technology and data is natural 
and inevitable, it is unsurprising for bias to come to the forefront of conversations around 
design and politically contentious topics, which is all the more reason to use bias 
constructively. When bias can be understood as situated in a larger system, rather than an 
individual shortcoming, I contend that we as a society can become better equipped to 
mitigate the disparities that emerge through bias. If mythologies of neutrality and trust are 
associated with technology and data use, then how can bias and mistrust be framed as 
constructive driving forces for design around political issues? In what follows, I discuss 
the role of mistrust in developing design guidelines for data use for police accountability.  
While a goal behind the adoption of data-driven technology is to induce more 
trust and accountability between stakeholders, my empirical results indicate that polices’ 
use of data stands to perpetuate further mistrust as data is perceived as an extension of 
police’s power. Further, considering the larger cultural context of “fake news,” mistrust 
could be characterized as another byproduct of data use. Matthew Carey, an 
anthropologist, contends that while we, as a society, value trust as a necessary condition 
for cooperation and functioning of societal interactions, mistrust is often reduced to the 
absence of trust-- simply the negative consequences of not having trust in something or 
someone [Carey, 2017]. However, he advocates that mistrust is an appropriate value and 
attitude to adopt in certain contexts. He supports this argument through an ethnographic 
case study of people living in the Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Here, social relations are 
based on the assumed unknowability of another person, meaning that mistrust in social 
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interactions is often common and accepted. Carey’s work is highly relevant to apply to 
design problems in HCI around politically contentious topics. In what follows, I outline 
the reasons why mistrust is an appropriate value to consider in the design of police 
accountability and data use practices. Then, I lay out concrete design implications for 
data creation and use. 
Police relations with POC communities in the United States has historically been 
a contentious topic, as systemically racist policies and laws have been enforced through 
the police on-the-ground [William, 2015]. Law enforcement agencies have been under 
intense social scrutiny, and social concerns range from racial bias to a lack of police 
oversight and accountability to lack of training [Delgado & Stefancic, 2015]. It is also 
important to note that this scrutiny is in part enabled by data, as critics of police use data 
to demonstrate the problems in policing [Lum, 2017; Eckhouse, 2017]. For example, 
Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG), a nonprofit organization, “applies 
rigorous science to the analysis of human rights violations” in the policing context 
[HRDAG, 2016]. HRDAG’s US policing project assesses and improves upon police 
violence data accuracy. Their work is, in part, a response to the lack of systematic data 
about police violence, which hinders police accountability [Lum, 2017]. Similarly, 
another Midwest activist organization released a data report in the last year on racial 
profiling in panhandling arrests; the reason why this report was necessary was exactly 
because this data had to be collected as an additional and external effort in the 
community, and this data was not provided (and worse, not available) from the police 
[James & Leininger, 2019]. While the police collect data for accountability, activists and 
community members’ needs for data are hardly fulfilled by the data police share. 
115 
As a response to these criticisms, the US government did advocate for using data-
driven strategies. For instance, the Obama administration launched the Police Data 
Initiative (PDI) and Data-Driven Justice Initiative (DDJ) in 2015 and 2016, respectively, 
to use data to “increase transparency, build community trust, and strengthen 
accountability” [Davis et. al. 2016]. As of late-2016, over 120 jurisdictions across the 
country, including our case study site, had committed to both PDI and DDJ. The adoption 
rate of these initiatives reaches about 30% of the American population. It is important to 
note that the future and impact of these Obama-era policies remains unclear under the 
Trump administration, especially considering these initiatives were never mandatory. 
Again, unless police data (both around crime and police actions) are collected through a 
consistent, regulated data frameworks, data use stands to fall short of being actionable for 
adequate police accountability.  
Consequently, researchers, organizers, and most of my participants were 
concerned about how police can use data to further marginalize and monitor communities 
of color [Eubanks, 2018; Goyanes, 2018]. It is important to note that while data and 
technology use stands to perpetuate several kinds of inequalities in society, the scope of 
this dissertation raised concerns specifically around racial and class-based biases. This 
work lies in a broader context of marginalization through technology use and also 
contributes to the work done by Black Lives Matter (BLM) and human rights activist 
organizations and researchers. While such issues around systemic bias are larger than 
technology use, I contribute to the area of HCI that advocates using data defensively to 
support collective action, protest systemic inequalities and in some cases, force 
accountability [Collins, 2012]. 
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Moving forward, keeping the systemic inequalities and biases within police 
organizations in mind, I contend that designing for trust is insufficient and perhaps, a bit 
idealistic than is appropriate in this context. The societal mistrust in police and police 
data is substantiated from the various perspectives presented in this research and thus, 
designing for trust assumes an implicit support for systems like police, which, for several 
stakeholders, simply does not exist. In order to combat this mistrust between 
communities and police, designing data-driven technologies, practices, and policies with 
biases and inequalities in mind can be a helpful way forward. If data use is to really 
improve the relationship between police and marginalized communities, then those 
communities’ concerns and experiences must be addressed through data use. 
Considering the groups of people whose values, interests, and biases are 
embedded in data-driven technologies and practices, and which groups are left out, it is 
important to design and use technology with the underlying assumption that racial and 
classist biases likely shapes data sets and practices. This means that more concrete and 
standardized data around police activity is necessary in order to better understand the 
experiences of both marginalized communities and the police. What police currently 
produce are narratives and data around crime in different communities. However, what 
remains undisclosed is an understanding of what the police do, who they treat as suspects 
versus community members, how many unarmed citizens are shot by the police, and what 
the racial make-up of these interactions are. Aggregate data from cities across the United 
States could help us, as a society, better understand and support the space for action 
through design, practice, and policies. For example, such aggregate data could include: 
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• Data on the make-up of police organizations (i.e., police officers’ race, ages, 
education level, years of experience, etc.). 
• Data on the race of community members who are pulled over, that is not self-
reported by the police (i.e., included in and pulled from driver’s licenses) 
• Data on how many chargeable offenses were discovered in proportion to how 
many POC were pulled over. 
• Data about police’s discretion to let a person go with a warning vs. a ticket. 
• Data about how many interactions end in police shootings (with armed and 
unarmed community members). 
• Data about the numbers of guns police confiscate nationally (because several of 
the police participants’ concerns around personal safety revolved around the 
prevalence of guns in the country). 
Racism in policing, to whatever extent, was a significant concern for the majority 
of stakeholders in my study. Here, I use Atyia Martin’s definition of racism, which is a 
“historically rooted system of dehumanizing power structures and behavior based on 
ideologies that reinforce the superiority of white people and inferiority of people of color, 
while harming both” [Martin, 2017]. While it is clear that police have power in our 
society to disrupt and serve different communities, systemically speaking, it could be 
argued that police officers are hardly equipped to do better (i.e., poor and unstandardized 
training, vicarious trauma, insufficient mental health support, legislation that criminalizes 
social issues, etc.) [Bottner, 1997; Bond, 2014]. Not only can using data defensively, with 
mistrust in mind, be helpful to legitimize the experiences of marginalized communities, 
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but it can also help legitimize the role police can play in society and the social challenges 
they face.  
Moreover, this research also provides avenues for future research directions in 
terms of how being data-driven can support different kinds of accountability in ways that 
can empower marginalized communities and unburden police organizations. For instance, 
abolitionist organizers in my study discussed alternative ways of conflict resolution and 
intracommunal accountability because they do not believe police to be a legitimate 
institution. Inversely, while police participants understood the need to be held 
accountable, a few officers did indicate that they are often called for civil conflicts that 
they cannot do much for in terms of legal charges. Here, data can be helpful in providing 
aggregated views of social issues that perpetuate criminal patterns. One of the frustrations 
our participants expressed was that while they understand how police actions impact 
communities negatively, directly addressing the comorbid issues associated with crime, 
namely poverty, mental illness, and drug addiction are beyond typical police jurisdiction 
and training. While other scholars argue that police play a role in exacerbating these 
issues [Bitner, 1976; Jacobs & Britt, 1979], the role of data in confronting police 
criticisms could help expand the issues police focus on and provide police with 
alternative ways of addressing these issues. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I address the following questions around the limitations and 
manifestations of biases in data-driven technologies and practices: 
1. How do the mythologies of data use manifest as organizational values for 
stakeholders? How does data stand to rationalize and legitimize spaces for action 
for these stakeholders? 
2. What are the challenges stakeholders experience in using data-driven technologies 
for shaping accountability? 
3. What are key value tensions for accountability between groups of people with 
large power disparities (i.e., police and marginalized communities)? 
Through this dissertation, I have demonstrated how human-services organizations 
adopting data-driven cultures are grappling with the human-centered issues emerging, as 
the limitations of quantitative data manifest in serving at-risk people equitably. 
Subsequently, I reorient the mythologies of objectivity, transparency, and trust to outline 
guidelines for the HCI community at the intersection of design, practice, and policy. I 
examined the sociotechnical contexts around data-driven cultures in human-services 
organizations and how it impacts principles like power, knowledge, and accountability. I 
examined this topic through three case studies in the nonprofit and policing contexts, 
where it is important to mind the unpredictable nature of human-beings [boyd & 
Crawford, 2012; Marshall, 2016; Verma & Voida, 2016]. I demonstrate how HCI is 
already engaging in the problem space of limitations and challenges of being data-driven 
and how a more explicit engagement with how the values and biases that shape data use 
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can help us mitigate the power disparities and exacerbation of existing inequalities in 
society.  
8.1 Chapter Summaries 
In each chapter, I have demonstrated the following: 
Chapter 1 
In Chapter 1, I outlined the problem space in HCI around data limitations and 
how HCI can contribute sociotechnical interventions to mitigate the biases and power that 
manifest in data use. I also present a case for how the mythologies associated with data 
use can be reoriented through design, practice, and policy changes. 
Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I situate my research in literature around information management 
in human-services organizations, data-driven policing, data bias and politics, community 
informatics, and accountability in government and HCI. I have identified the gaps in 
these areas of literature and indicated how my research fits at the intersection of this 
previous work. 
Chapter 3  
In Chapter 3, I outline the qualitative methods used in this three-phase research. I 
illustrate how the methodologies used in these case studies enabled me to better 
understand data-driven technologies and practices, related sociotechnical challenges, and 
possible design interventions for human-services.  
Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I present results from the first case study of the use of data-driven 
systems in a nonprofit, human services organization. Here, I have characterized four 
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mythologies of data-driven systems that participants experience as shared organizational 
values and are core to their trajectory towards a “culture of data.” I have also discussed 
the ways in which being actionable is impeded by a disconnect between the aggregate 
views of data and the desired “drill down” views of data that would allow the users to 
understand how to act in a data-driven context. These findings contribute initial empirical 
evidence for the impact of data-driven technology’s epistemological biases on 
organizations and suggest implications for the design of technologies to better support 
data-driven decision making by legitimizing non-traditional forms of data. 
Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, I have presented results from my second qualitative field study 
about the adoption of data-driven policing strategies in a Midwestern police department 
in the United States. Here, I have identified three key challenges police face with data-
driven adoption efforts: data-driven frictions, precarious and inactionable insights, and 
police metis concerns. I demonstrate the issues that data-driven initiatives create for 
policing and the open questions police agents face. These findings contribute an 
empirical account of how policing agents attend to the strengths and limits of big data’s 
knowledge claims, as well as helped me develop the problem space for how biases 
manifest in data-driven policing and how data-driven policing can hinder accountability. 
Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, I shared results from the final qualitative field study with various 
stakeholders around police accountability, including police officers, anti-police activists, 
and various community members. Here, the results demonstrated that stakeholders’ 
concerns around data use for police accountability revolve around how data stands to be 
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an extension of police’s power. These key issues emerged around who has the power to 
create and legitimize data as knowledge, who gets to utilize that data to receive and 
allocate resources and services, and finally, how police’s data use stands to exacerbate 
the policing and surveillance of marginalized communities. This work has built upon the 
previous two case studies to contribute design guidelines for HCI around data practice, 
design, and policy.  
Chapter 7  
In Chapter 7, I have analyzed the empirical work to demonstrate the design space 
around data-driven technology and practices. This research contributes to the calls for the 
HCI community to consider design implications around the limitations of data use and 
what it means for the human-beings being served by such organizations (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Contributions to Gaps in Literature 
Gap in Literature Contribution 
Studying the human experience of data-
driven technologies that manifest the 
computational turn in thinking in 
organizations. 
Offer empirical case studies of the 
adoption and use of data-driven 
technologies and the related sociotechnical 
breakdowns in data use for human-
services. 
Multiple researchers have called for 
investigation into the epistemological 
biases and how they play out in practice 
within organizations [Boyd & Crawford, 
2012; Crawford, 2013]. 
Identify key epistemological biases in 
data-driven technologies and how those 
biases manifest in and impact 
organizational decision-making 
actionability. 
While HCI researchers have considered 
value sensitive design in the context of 
social injustice issues, there is a dearth of 
results around how value tensions are 
embodied in relation to power disparities 
[Dombrowski et. al., 2016]. 
Identify value tensions that emerge 
between power disparate users of data in 
contentious spaces. 
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As HCI scholars identify the limitations 
and challenges with data use, researchers 
call for investigating the design space to 
mitigate the problems that emerge with 
technology production and use [Verma & 
Voida, 2016; Verma & Dombrowski, 
2018]. 
Developed possible avenues for the HCI 
community to deal with the power 
disparities that are reflected in data use 
through applying existing concepts of 
strong objectivity, information 
transparency, and mistrust in order to 
support more robust accountability. 
HCI researchers have also called for 
consideration of how we provide design 
guidelines situated at the intersection of 
design, practice, and policy, for 
actionable change [Jackson et. al., 2014]. 
Offer design orientations at the 
intersection of policy, practice, and design 
to address the sociotechnical issues that 
arise from data production and use, based 
on the identified challenges of this 
research. 
 
In order to address these limitations, I reorient the mythologies around data use 
(objectivity, transparency, and trust) into pragmatic design guidelines for the HCI 
community to address the inherent biases in data use. To mitigate the mythology of 
objectivity, I use the concept of strong objectivity to demonstrate how designers and 
practitioners could mitigate the power disparities in whose voices are represented in the 
design, practice, and policies around data. To address the issue of data framing narratives, 
I advocate for designing with principles of information transparency. Finally, I argue that 
to improve data’s credibility further, particularly in contentious and power disparate 
contexts, mistrust is a more appropriate value to adopt to guide data practices.  
8.2 Broader Implications 
There is an increased pressure to produce evidence of impact and outcomes for 
key stakeholders, particularly for human-services organizations [Snibbe, 2006]. This 
research echoes the call to account for the human, social element of such mission-driven 
organizations, particularly because of their investment in people rather than profit [Gillon 
et. al., 2012]. My research indicates that quantitative data and data-driven technologies 
fall short of their promise of helping organizations support ground truth, accountability, 
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and actionability. While quantitative data enables organizations to rationalize and 
legitimize decision-making, my participants expressed serious concern around how such 
data shapes and constrains spaces for action and accountability. For instance, in Morgan’s 
seminal scholarship around the metaphors for organizational cultures, he compares 
quantitative data to magic in primitive society, enabling clear-cut decisions to be made in 
otherwise ambiguous and uncertain situations [Morgan, 1997]. Subsequently, such 
decision-support, as evident through this dissertation, is rife with manifestations of biases 
and power disparities. While unpacking the biases that are embedded in data-driven 
systems may be particularly important for the organizations in my case studies, the kinds 
of epistemological biases highlighted in this research could be of relevance to other 
similar organizations across sectors of society.  
Ultimately, this research also calls for the recognition that there is a human being 
who underlies the data. This means that the question of how to act and make decisions 
based on data becomes a fundamentally moral one. Particularly considering socially 
contentious topics of police brutality and marginalized experiences, HCI researchers have 
a strong responsibility to address the design challenge of how to legitimize data that is 
most meaningful for being actionable, where what it means to be actionable hinges on the 
moral treatment of individuals.  
Without consideration of these human-centered issues around data-use, data-
driven efforts will likely remain insufficient, or worse, provide a false sense of security 
and continue perpetuating inequalities. While I believe HCI is well suited to take this 
challenge on, this research has constantly highlighted the intertwined nature of 
technology and the policies around it. Because technology alone cannot address a history 
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of unequal citizenship and power disparities, we, as HCI researchers, must advocate for 
more robust and relevant policies that consider the ethics and limitations of technology 
use, especially in sensitive and consequential contexts of poverty and criminal justice. 
Similarly, because I have conceptualized bias here as a systemic symptom than individual 
shortcomings in this research, human-centered policies around data limitations are 
necessary to achieve a more equitable use of data. 
8.3 Future Work 
This research provides a few routes for possible research. First, future research 
should explore the potentially varied relationships among quantitative and qualitative 
data in data-driven decision making and the actionable use of data. Understanding how 
data supports decision-making across a variety of different organizations could provide a 
more comprehensive design space for legitimizing non-traditional forms of data.  
Second, because this research has called to reconsider the design for qualitative 
data (structured and unstructured), it would be beneficial to further study how design 
could support collection of non-typical data types across the entire ecology of 
information systems. This research challenge has implications for the user interface down 
to the underlying infrastructure, as well as for the interoperability of these systems. There 
need to be accessible ways of collecting—thus, validating—non-typical data types so that 
they stand a chance of making it into aggregations of data in the first place, as well as 
accessible ways of aggregating qualitative data across multiple systems.. The design 
implications of this research extend beyond the data-driven tools and implicate the entire 
pipeline of information management tools that constitute the ecology of systems being 
adopted by data-driven organizations.  
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Third, as more organizations implement data-driven strategies, the need for data 
literacy training is increasingly evident. Data literacy is important for workers throughout 
the organization (as well as citizens), ranging from the administrators, who make 
decisions, to workers on-the-ground, who collect and implement data in the communities. 
I recommend further investigation of how data literacy could be provided to demonstrate 
the politicized nature of data—how data plays a role in confirming and countering biases.  
Lastly, there is more research required around governmental policies that can 
regulate data-driven accountability for contexts like the police. My research made it 
evident that designing to combat the limitations of data with the police was not viable; 
the police do not have incentive (or the capacity) to work on changing their data 
practices. There is a need to further understand how data requirements could be 
standardized to enable consistent data around police accountability throughout the 
country. 
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Appendix 
Scenarios 
Police Perspective Scenario: 
Police officers across the USA are evaluated individually and organizationally based on 
certain quantifiable activities (i.e., number of arrests, tickets, warnings, cases closed, 
etc.). However, police officers on-the-ground as well as experts in the field have 
emphasized that several components of their activities and interactions with communities 
are not and/or cannot be documented, but stand to have a positive impact. For instance, 
an officer’s relationship with community members often leads to certain kinds of 
information that emerge from having familiarity and personal connections with 
community members. Similarly, certain pieces of knowledge cannot be captured, which 
can be based in experiences, local information, and relationships.  
Design prompt: Keeping what you have said so far about police accountability in mind 
and this scenario, brainstorm some ideas (through technology or social interventions) that 
could help improve police and community relationships in the near future. How could 
technological or social space help accountability to improve in the next five years? What 
are ways of holding the police accountable in ways that are not possible right now? What 
are other ways of holding each other within our communities accountable? 
Community Perspective Scenario: 
Accountability in government is meant to support (a) identifying performance issues in 
order to (b) mobilize the public and ultimately, (c) create change in policies and practices. 
Subsequently, using data to improve accountability raises questions about the process of 
collecting, analyzing, and presenting data. Who gets to decide what data is collected? 
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How is it analyzed? How is it presented? What isn’t being collected and reported? Data 
use within a governmental organization can often be an obscure and imbalanced process. 
The decision-making around what data is collected, by whom, how data is analyzed and 
reported to the community remains inaccessible to community stakeholders. The 
community often does not have opportunities to contribute their perspectives in the 
discussion about what data to collect and for what purpose.  
Design prompt:  
Keeping what you’ve said so far about police accountability in mind and this scenario, 
brainstorm ideas about addressing the lack of input and access community members have 
to the process of data-driven policing. How can community members engage in what and 
how data is collected and used by police?  
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